How much does it cost? “War and Peace” – Maritime Security Forum Analysis
Three years to the day after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the fate of this aggressed country remains uncertain. The far-reaching consequences of Europe’s biggest armed conflict since the Second World War are hard to predict. At stake are not only the existence, sovereignty and integrity of the Ukrainian state, but also the physical future, political freedom and economic prosperity of the Ukrainian people, and perhaps the future of Europe.
At the European level, a Russian victory would reverse the strategic effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and catalyze Russia’s goal of rebuilding a modern Russian empire by limiting the sovereignty of states east of the Oder-Neisse line. This was the explicit goal of Russia’s draft agreement proposed to the US and NATO in December 2021 in preparation for the February 2022 invasion.
A Russian victory in Ukraine would significantly increase the burden on existing NATO members to prevent the realization of the goals set out in these agreements. Despite the sacrifices made in the war, Russia’s armed forces are larger than they were at the beginning of the aggression and have gained combat experience in a way that NATO’s armed forces are not capable of.
From a global perspective, the territorial reduction of Ukraine would represent the unilateral annexation of a European territory that was legally recognized as belonging to another state after World War II.
Before 2014, Russia was party to bilateral agreements, notably the Russia-EU summit on January 28, 2003. The Treaty on Ukraine, which recognized that Ukraine’s borders were set in accordance with the international order established by the victorious countries of World War II, including the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, but Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 set the stage for the collapse of that order, but was only recognized by Russia itself and ten atypical states, including China.
Today, Russia incorporates almost a fifth of Ukraine into its constitutional territory, including territories not (yet) under its control. Conversely, if Russia fails to end the war in Ukraine on its own terms, it is likely to embark on new adventures against its European neighbors, limiting its ability to expand its power and influence abroad.
Moscow’s paralysis during the overthrow of its longtime partner in Syria can at least partly be explained by a more urgent need to act in Ukraine. Overall, strategic competition between the United States and China will inevitably suffer. Given the strategic dominance of the Indo-Pacific region and the broad US consensus on relations with China, the fate of Ukraine cannot remain indifferent whichever administration is in power in Washington.
A Russian victory would set a standard and model of strategic performance that China would like to emulate vis-à-vis Taiwan, but if Moscow fails to win in Kiev, China could be put on strategic alert. If Russia does win, the strategic challenge posed by China will be greater, despite the fact that Russia and China are closely linked in a strategic partnership.
These risks are compounded by the unpredictability of any major war, including potential domino effects, such as nuclear proliferation in Iran or North Korea, or unknown uncertainties, such as the collapse of the current Syrian regime or the situation in the Gaza Strip.
The current state of the war, the uncertain prospects of any agreement backed by US President Donald Trump to stop the bloodshed, the uncertain future of the US as guarantor of defense in Europe, and Europe’s options in this difficult situation, influence the debates and analysis.
War or Peace in 2025
At first glance, the war has not been very satisfying for the Kremlin, as it has failed to destroy Ukraine on the battlefield. Since the beginning of the war, Russia has suffered 700,000 casualties, including up to 200,000 killed in action, suffering tremendous material damage, using some 3,000 interceptor cruise missiles and more main battle tanks than the total number of all 32 NATO member states combined.
Thanks to generous recruitment incentives, foreign mercenaries, plentiful supplies and a healthy revenue stream for the purchase of foreign equipment and components, the Russian authorities have absorbed these losses without major difficulties.
However, there is little evidence to show the price paid by Russia.
By December 2022, Russia had captured only 3,000square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, roughly the same size as Luxembourg, and as of the summer of 2023, Russia has lost its ability to block the flow of goods by water, including Ukraine’s vital grain exports to much of the Middle East and African countries. And this is, in our judgment, also due to the counterbalancing of the naval situation in the Black Sea by the use of maritime attack drones, both to lead to the redeployment of Russian naval assets to the eastern Black Sea (from where they can operate missiles as well), but more importantly by the possibility of counterbalancing Russian threats with the threat of disrupting oil exports from Novorossiysk, which would massively disrupt the Kremlin’s revenues. Crimea’s large naval base in Sevastopol, once an important strategic asset, has now become a military liability.
Russia has dealt a major blow to Ukraine’s infrastructure, but the electricity supply is still sufficient to power Ukraine. Ukraine has also succeeded in moving the war onto Russian territory, having more than symbolic effects on air bases, munitions factories and oil facilities from Kaliningrad to Murmansk and from the outskirts of Moscow to Tatarstan. By August 2024, Ukrainian ground forces had captured key points of the Suja gas pipeline base and occupied more than 1,300 square kilometers of the Russian Kursk region, and by January 2025, Ukrainian forces facing off against Russian and North Korean forces still held much of the region. This success has been achieved despite delaying the delivery of certain platforms, such as F-16 fighter jets (by as much as a year), and the US continuing to refuse to transfer deep strike air-launched weapons such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Surface-to-Surface Missile (JASSM), prohibiting until the final weeks of the Biden administration the use of US-made weapons beyond the Russian front line; even as $40 billion dollars comes from Europe and accounts for about one-sixth of NATO’s military procurement spending.
However, as recently as last summer, Ukrainian political and military officials were claiming that the war would end in 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “victory plan,” published in the fall, seems to indicate that Ukraine’s intention is to boost morale, not to convey despair that “all is lost.”
However, it seems that the tone of the private conversations is somber.
There are significant tactical and operational concerns.
Ukraine faces serious difficulties in establishing a mobilization system that can effectively and fairly deliver front-line units in the eyes of potential recruits and their families. Desertions are frequent, demoralization is widespread, and soldiers in their 40s are the rule rather than the exception. Ukraine’s battlefield casualties (some 43 000 killed in combat) are much lower than Russia’s, but unacceptable for a country like Ukraine.
The US has asked Ukraine to set the age of conscription at 18 instead of the current 25. The US calculation is understandable, but an invitation to be more generous with young blood is unlikely to find support, especially from a country that abolished conscription in 1973. For many Ukrainians, the US proposal reflects not only a lack of empathy but also restrictions on deep strikes against Russian forces.
From a strategic point of view, perhaps the most important concern is the precarious state of the electricity infrastructure, with only nuclear power plants immune from direct attack but not the distribution system. A colder-than-normal winter and the low strike rate by North Korea’s supplied Hwasong ballistic missile systems have avoided causing economic collapse and unprecedented hardship for citizens living in Soviet-era high-rises without central heating, water and sewage.
What is clear is that Western assistance remains essential, and Ukraine will need more equipment (especially Patriot missile batteries), more types of missiles (e.g. additional JASSMs) and more flexible restrictions on their use to continue to fight.
In the spring of 2024, Ukraine suffered a devastating ammunition shortage after the Republican-controlled US House of Representatives refused for months to approve funding requested by the Biden administration. If the Trump administration similarly halts new aid requests, Ukraine is unlikely to be able to cope on the battlefield. The same goes for France and Germany.
It is also essential for Ukraine to maintain its forces for the United States to continue to relax restrictions on the use of US-made long-range missiles behind the Russian front line, just as it has allowed its allies to lift similar restrictions on Ukraine’s use of air-launched cruise missiles, such as the British and French Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP Storm Shadow/SCALP.
If Ukraine’s Western partners maintain the current flow of arms and ammunition and keep permissive conditions on their use, the military situation in Ukraine could become more manageable, especially if additional missile defenses are quickly and generously provided and work well during the offensive on Ukraine’s energy system.
Of course, it remains to be seen what decisions Washington and European capitals will take on these issues.
Where is Article 5?
Undoubtedly, many interpret Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of Mutual Assistance of the Allied Powers as meaning more than what is written there, knowing that in its drafting it was watered down to facilitate the passage of the Washington Treaty through the US Senate.
Historically, however, Article 5 has been a powerful deterrent. No enemy, including the Soviet Union at the height of the Berlin crisis of the early 1960s, has ever seriously tested Article 5; no non-NATO country has ever deliberately engaged in armed conflict within NATO; no NATO country has ever deliberately engaged in armed conflict within NATO; and no NATO country has ever deliberately engaged in armed conflict in the region.
Both adversaries and allies have generally interpreted this clause as a full US commitment to the defense of Europe. Will it remain so?
According to the deal, Ukraine’s NATO membership would guarantee Ukraine’s security against Russian aggression, which has prompted the Kremlin to oppose membership. This is why Finland rushed to join NATO when the Russian invasion of Ukraine became a major threat, followed by Sweden, but after tough negotiations with Turkey.
Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it does not mean reducing the credibility of Article 5, even if there is quite a lot of discussion on the subject. Ukraine is not a NATO member state, and the precedent of the forcible annexation of Crimea in 2014 did not prompt Russia to test Article 5. Some analysts had already begun to question whether NATO would be able or willing to defend Estonia, with its border only 100 kilometers from St. Petersburg.
President Trump’s long-standing rejection of alliances in general and his antipathy towards NATO in particular often call into question the real strength of the US defense guarantee. In February 2024, he declared that Russia “can do whatever it wants ” to NATO countries that do not pay their dues. This Trump-style attack was not an interpreted as a frontal attack on Article 5. Article 5 was not mentioned, but conditioned the US commitment from obligation to financial agreement.
In addition to the US conceptual overhaul, the West’s failure to achieve satisfactory results in Ukraine may also change Russia’s own assessment of the true meaning of Article 5. Trends in Euro-Atlantic relations are unlikely to prevent such a development. It may be difficult to dissuade Russian leaders who believe that their country’s armed forces have achieved victory in Ukraine by pursuing smaller and less robust goals. For example, conquering Lithuania and establishing continuity between mainland Russia and the Kaliningrad region of the Baltic Sea might be militarily feasible, even if a German Bundeswehr brigade were deployed in the region. To test this, Putin could first attack Moldova, which is struggling to get out from under Russia’s military influence and political pressure. Gagauzia and Transnistria are a kind of consolation prize for dividing and ruling the unconquered Ukraine after the war. If that happens, politically unstable Romania, an important member of the EU and NATO, will have to decide whether to choose the path of resistance or the path of Hungarian PM Viktor Orban.
Russia could offer to cede the Ukrainian Carpathians to Hungary if they win. Budapest might then find it less appropriate to invoke Article 5. There is considerable disaster area, much of which can be obtained through influence and exploitation of the gray areas. It would only take a few careless or misunderstood words from President Trump about NATO to ignite the geopolitical fire.
In the face of these constraints and uncertainties, Europe will struggle to cope with even the most optimistic scenario in which Ukraine continues to contain Russian forces and achieves a secure peace without subjugation, and NATO remains a credible transatlantic military alliance at its current level, with US input. At a minimum, this would require Europe to continue to provide arms, munitions and other military assistance at current levels, which amount to about €20 billion a year, or about 15% of Europe’s total defense spending. This goal is currently met by spending 2% of GDP on defense, which is the European NATO average, and 23 of NATO’s 31 non-US members will meet or exceed this goal by 2025. However, reaching this level is no easy task. Germany, the largest European military donor to Ukraine, had to add €100 billion to reach 2%. In addition, the current level of effort is insufficient to replenish depleted stocks, especially 155mm artillery shells, which have proven to need EU funding.
Moreover, the optimistic scenarios do not take into account NATO’s pre-emptive defense against other potential Russian military challenges, which amount to a third of the conventional forces NATO needs in Europe. As the “military famine” in Ukraine in early 2024 brutally demonstrated, despite European commitments and efforts, they will not compensate for the financial and industrial disruption of US support to Ukraine, despite European commitments and efforts. Since the beginning of the great occupation, US military aid has amounted to about 60 billion US dollars, while European aid has amounted to 40 billion euros. To cover this difference would require 7% of Europe’s total defense spending.
This is a disappointing assessment and not a direct indictment of Europe’s performance, which has increased its military spending far more than the United States or any other major power. Europe has provided 40% of Western military aid to Ukraine and the bulk of non-military funding. There is no burden-sharing scandal here.
Some of the funds allocated by Europe have gone to the US for military orders, some still undelivered or even blocked for use only on terms set by the world leader. Does the US add to the amount of money and equipment paid by Europe? Perhaps not.
It is also worth noting that some NATO members, such as Poland with 4.1% and Estonia with 3.4%, spend as much or more on defense than the United States, a superpower with global interests and goals, which spends 3.4% of its GDP on defense.
And then we ask the question: will the 5% of GDP for defense be for everyone, or except the US?
At best, the costs would increase even more if a competent European peacekeeping force were deployed in Ukraine as part of the post-war process. Such a force would consist of several combat-ready brigades supported by the United States. NATO forces deployed in the much smaller European theaters of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo included 50,000 and 39,000 troops from NATO countries, respectively. Ukraine, a much larger country with a line of contact of about 1,000 kilometers, will require a much larger force than that deployed in the Balkans. In this respect, it would be difficult to sustain an optimistic scenario involving the modernization of the NATO forces deployed so far at a cost of less than 3% of GDP. However, this is less than the amount accumulated by the major Western European countries at the end of the Cold War. This would mean increasing defense spending to over $500 billion from the current $380 billion, and it is not surprising that 3% is being discussed as the new 2% ahead of the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague.
This self-imposed target could have the desired effect of softening President Trump’s anti-NATO bias and allowing him to give Putin credit, even if he is the real agent of change. This is possible even as European citizens complain about the increased burden. European citizens, especially German citizens, continue to realize the importance of avoiding defeat to Russia and the resulting wave of refugees.
One factor that could change European public opinion regarding support for Ukraine is the perception that much of Europe’s increased defense spending is being used to subsidize and line the pockets of the American defense industry. The European Commission’s so-called “Draghi Report” claims that two-thirds of new European defense orders come from American companies. A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) refutes this claim and puts the figure closer to 30%. The reality is that Europe’s war effort will double unless the US helps Ukraine again. Furthermore, if the US refuses to support European peacekeeping deployments, Europe will need brigades of greater numbers and quality than the “Balkan level“, making deployment difficult, if not impossible, both politically and practically.
If President Trump once again asks Russia to do “what it wants” elsewhere, without considering practical burden-sharing, this could destroy the Transatlantic Pact and pave the way for a new Russian neo-imperialist adventure. This is the worst-case scenario, and not an unlikely one.
There is no guarantee that Europe will receive protection at any price. Initially satisfied with NATO’s target of 2% of GDP, Trump has raised the bar to 3% and, according to the latest news, is now aiming for 5% of US defense spending, which is well above 3.4% of US GDP. In a way, the protector asks for more than he gets in return, and his ambitions know no bounds. Trump has openly threatened Denmark, a close NATO ally, with punitive tariffs and has said he is prepared to use force if the country continues to oppose the US annexation of Greenland.
US threats and accusations of blackmail will poison future transatlantic talks and influence European policy decisions.
If the US backs down, Europe will have to compensate for its contribution, based so far on an underestimated rate of consumption of arms and munitions in modern warfare. The additional cost, depending on the scenario, is estimated at between 100 and 350 billion US dollars. It is very doubtful whether Europe will have the strategic focus and unity of will to face such a challenge, including a defense spending burden exceeding 3% of GDP.
However, regardless of Europe’s specific strategic decisions, it can be concluded that without the goodwill and cooperation of the EU, which remains the world’s largest trading bloc, and the confidence of its Indo-Pacific partners, which fear abandonment, the US is likely to face China.
Maritime Security Forum