BLACK SEA CHRONICLES / CMN. Geopolitical logbook at the Euxin Bridge13 th edition, 30 MAI 2024-Weekly summary prepared by the experts of the Black Sea House Association / Black Sea House- Constanta, Coordinator Dorin POPESCU
BLACK SEA CHRONICLES / CMN.
Geopolitical logbook at the Euxin Bridge
13th edition, Thursday 30 May 2024
I. White Chronicles
The Kremlin’s red lines on the hot topics of the war in Ukraine. On the occasion of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tashkent, he formulated and conveyed the following red lines: if NATO countries send troops/contingents to the territory of Ukraine (direct reference preferred to Poland, indirect reference to France), they will enter the area of action of the Russian Armed Forces – sending troops will be “a new escalation and another step towards a serious conflict in Europe and a global conflict”; foreign trainers and mercenaries from NATO countries already exist in Ukraine, and they are targets of the Russian army; the use of high-precision Western weaponry by the Ukrainian army to strike targets on Russian territory will have serious consequences in Europe, the Russian army will expand its current security zone on Ukrainian territory commensurate with the range of offensive weaponry, and the effects of such strikes on targets in Russia will be modest.
The international peace summit in Switzerland is reconfiguring. At the first International Peace Summit on Ukraine, to be held on 14-15 June this year in Switzerland, three areas – food security, nuclear security and the humanitarian crisis – of Ukraine’s famous 10-point peace formula (Zelensky formula) will be discussed as a priority. It is unlikely that major state actors such as the US and China will be present at the summit. Western states will attend the Summit, with some small exceptions, at the level of heads of state or government. Many other countries, especially from the Global South (Brazil, India, South Africa, etc.), as well as the US and China, are preparing to participate in the Summit at a lower level. The agenda and objectives of the Peace Summit are already much narrower than originally planned. The organisers see this Summit as the beginning of a long process of international discussions on securing peace in Ukraine. A draft communiqué on the results of the Summit (which would include references to 9 of the 10 points of the Zelensky Formula) is already circulating internationally, according to the Russian press. Parallel initiatives are being outlined and developed, including similar peace conferences with mutual and equal participation of Ukraine and Russia (China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc. are in favour of such a solution). The long-term success of the Swiss Peace Summit, ensured by the holding of further summits, will depend on the development of the competing initiatives. A balanced and concrete outcome of this Summit will prioritise this international platform for debate over competing ones.
Bilateral agreements increasingly strengthen Ukraine’s security. Ukraine has recently signed bilateral Security Cooperation Agreements with Spain and Belgium. The bilateral agreement with Belgium provides for $977 million in military support to Ukraine in 2024 and the delivery of 30 F-16 aircraft by the end of 2028. The bilateral agreement with Spain provides for €1 billion in military support to Ukraine in 2024 (military assistance including Patriot missiles and Leonard 2 tanks) and €5 billion over the next 3 years through the European Peace Facility Ukraine Assistance Fund. So far, Ukraine has signed bilateral security agreements with the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain and Belgium. Bilateral agreements are also being negotiated with other countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, Romania, etc. Main sectoral areas of cooperation of the latest bilateral agreements (Spain and Belgium): Military cooperation, security cooperation, military-technical support, support to Ukraine’s defence industry, military support and assistance, strengthening of air defence capabilities, artillery and armoured vehicles, training of troops, political support for the restoration of territorial integrity within the internationally recognised borders of 1991, cooperation in the fields of intelligence, fight against organised crime and defence industry, in particular by exploring opportunities for joint production and the development of Ukraine’s defence industry, humanitarian aid, Ukraine’s economic recovery and reconstruction, support for Ukraine’s reforms with a view to EU and NATO membership, support for the promotion of the Ukrainian peace formula, strengthening of sanctions against Russia, introduction of a mechanism for compensating damages and bringing the Russian aggressor to justice, cooperation in sectoral areas such as energy security, cyber security and combating cyber and hybrid threats, etc. The documents also provide for joint projects in the field of arms production.
Putin is constantly perfecting his “small circle” in the executive. Recent changes in the power vertical in Putin’s system, initiated with nominal changes in the composition of the government, continue. Nikolai Patrushev’s “diplomatic mazilization” is confirmed (appointed deputy to the President from the post of Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; the new deputy/adviser does not have a generous job description in terms of top-level duties, is not responsible for the Military-Industrial Complex, etc.); Nikolai Patrushev did not travel to China – on behalf of the Presidential Administration’s staff, adviser Ușakov was present in Beijing; although he has “direct input” to the President, this appears to be “secondary input”; as a recommendation, Nikolai Patrushev’s son was promoted to Deputy Prime Minister). The rise of former bodyguard Alexei Diumin (former governor of the Tula region, recently appointed both as a lieutenant/adviser in the Presidential Administration’s staff and as Secretary of the State Council; the new lieutenant/adviser has a more relevant job description than Nikolai Patrushev and is one of the main beneficiaries of Vladimir Putin’s new roar to power) continues. Alexei Diumin (who is mainly responsible for providing resources for the Armed Forces) and Denis Manturov, the first deputy prime minister in charge of the Military-Industrial Complex, are expected to continue their ascension.
Strategic repositioning for the presidential (and parliamentary) elections in Moldova. Two political blocs have already announced their formation in the Republic of Moldova, with the priority of supporting a common candidate in the presidential elections. The first, the pro-Russian Victory/Pobeda political bloc, revolves around Ilan Shor; it is currently considering advancing a single candidacy for the presidential elections on 20 October this year. A second pro-Russian bloc could link the Party of Socialists (Igor Dodon) with the Communist Party (Vladimir Voronin). The two pro-Russian blocs are already in quasi-public negotiations with the aim of harmonising/coordinating their candidacies and political action in the presidential elections. A second bloc created is the pro-European political bloc “Together”, made up of the Dignity and Truth Platform, the Unity and Welfare Coalition (Igor Munteanu), the Party of Change and the League of Cities and Communes. The bloc intends to run its own candidate in the elections. At its initiative, several political parties recently signed the Pact for Europe in Chisinau. Subsequent statements by Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chisinau and political leader of the National Alternative Movement (MAN) party, that he will not stand in the presidential elections in October 2024, intensify the discussions and political struggle to identify and promote a relevant counter-candidate to Maia Sandu’s candidacy by the pro-Russian party in Chisinau; in a possible electoral race against Maia Sandu, possible candidates such as Igor Dodon, Igor Chicu, Irina Vlah (former Bashkan of UTA Gagauzia), Alexandr Stoianoglu, etc. are mentioned. Ion Ceban’s statements seem to simplify the voting options on the anti Maia Sandu side. According to recent polls, Maia Sandu’s best candidates in a possible second round would be Igor Dodon (PSRM), Ion Chicu (PDCM), Vladimir Voronin (PCRM), Renato Usatâi (PN), Irina Vlah (independent). The European right is counting on a victory for Maia Sandu in the first round. A second round against a strong left-wing challenger could put her re-election at risk. Pro-electoral dynamics are very fast.
Growing European and Euro-Atlantic support for Moldova’s security and defence. The EU and the Republic of Moldova recently signed the Security and Defence Partnership. Relevant provisions of the document : the parties undertake to “update existing EU-Moldova security and defence consultations in an annual EU-Moldova Security and Defence Dialogue at the level of Heads of Directorates/Directors General”, as well as to “explore the possibility of establishing additional thematic consultations on specific areas of common interest (such as cyber issues, countering foreign intelligence manipulation and interference (FIMI) etc. )”; “the EU and Moldova will conduct targeted consultations and foster cooperation in the following areas: exchanges of information on security and defence policies and relevant regional security, strategic and geopolitical issues to better align mutual policies, EU CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions and operations, countering hybrid threats, cyber cooperation, non-proliferation and disarmament, conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), security and defence capacity building, strategic communication and countering foreign intelligence manipulation and interference (FIMI), counter-terrorism and preventing/controlling violent extremism” etc. The signing of this Partnership has provoked hostile reactions in Moscow. The recent visits of the Moldovan foreign and defence ministers to Bucharest and the documents concluded on this occasion confirm the excellent bilateral relations between Romania and Moldova and the trend towards their consolidation. The Republic of Moldova is preparing to organise a new edition of the trilateral meeting between Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. Visiting Chisinau, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reaffirmed the strong political support of the US for the security of the Republic of Moldova and announced an American investment of $85 million (out of the $300 million USAID fund) to enhance Moldova’s energy security. The US official also noted that the US has provided $110 million in direct budget support in recent years to offset higher electricity prices in Moldova.
More and more states are waiving conditions on the use of their arms delivered to Ukraine to carry out strikes against military targets on the territory of the Russian Federation. The NATO Secretary General recently encouraged member states providing military-technical support to Ukraine to waive limitations on the use of weapons delivered to Ukraine for strikes against targets on the territory of the Russian Federation. A meeting of defence ministers of EU member states was held in Brussels on the issue. Statements on the waiver of conditionality have been made in public by various high-ranking officials (including top officials) from at least 10 European countries: the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Sweden, Lithuania, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, etc. Statements to this effect have also recently been made by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Canada has reiterated that no conditions/limitations have been imposed on the Ukrainian side regarding the use of arms and combat equipment delivered to Ukraine. The US as well as some European countries (Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, etc.) continue to maintain their conditionalities. There are some signs that the US will change its position in the coming period. The trend is one of a rapid increase in the number of states allowing Ukraine to use their delivered weapons to carry out strikes on targets in the Russian Federation. Ukraine’s strike force against military targets in Russia (missile launch centres, logistics centres, technical and weapons depots, etc.) is thus expected to increase significantly in the coming period. Moscow’s reaction: Russia is again threatening to create a wider sanitary zone (security zone) on Ukrainian territory to protect itself from Ukraine’s strikes. President Putin repeats the threats, in particular against ‘small states’ (NATO member states), whose representatives ‘must be aware of what they are playing with’ (possible reference to Poland) and again mentions ‘serious effects and consequences in Europe’ in the event of the Ukrainian army using high-precision, long-range weapons against targets on Russian territory.
Russian party in the Republic of Moldova, bags of rubles ready to boycott the referendum on Europe. Pro-Russian political leaders in the Republic of Moldova have announced the launch of a nationwide campaign against the holding of a constitutional referendum on Moldova’s accession to the EU on October 20. Igor Dodon (chairman of the Socialist Party), Vladimir Voronin (chairman of the Communist Party) and Ilan Shor (leader/co-founder of the Victory political bloc) are calling on the population to boycott participation in the referendum by either refusing to turn in their ballots or answering the question on the ballot paper in the negative. The three leaders are trying to coordinate the timing of the referendum boycott. The Moldovan press is alleging that Moscow is preparing significant sums of money to boost the referendum boycott. Some of the sums prepared have already been sent to Chisinau; the Chisinau authorities have prevented the sending of other relevant sums, intended to boycott the referendum in question. In the coming period, the propaganda activities of the Russian party in the Republic of Moldova on the referendum will be intensified.
New military-technical support measures for Ukraine. Spain and Belgium have announced new military support and military assistance packages for 2024, under recently signed bilateral agreements (detailed above). The Government of Sweden has announced a new military support package for Ukraine (the 16th), worth around $1.3 billion (13.1 billion kroner), which will see the delivery to Ukraine of armoured personnel carriers, SAAB Saab-340 AEW&C research aircraft equipped with ASC 890 radio-location systems, and Jaktrobot Rb 99 medium-range guided missiles. Sweden will provide Ukraine with military aid under a two-year support programme worth $7 billion (75 billion kronor). The Lithuanian government has provided €5 million for the construction of shelters at educational establishments in Ukraine. Germany announced a new humanitarian aid package. Visiting Odessa, the German Defence Minister announced a new military support package worth around $500 million.
Hungary is increasingly isolating itself in Europe and the “West” and is seeking the light of liberalism in Minsk. On an official visit to Minsk, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó said (along with his Belarusian counterpart) that Hungary was in danger from the military rhetoric of some EU and NATO member countries. According to him, statements by some Western leaders on the conflict in Ukraine, especially those about the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine, are “appalling”. Szijjártó believes that the current conflict in Ukraine can only be resolved through peaceful negotiations. On this occasion, the foreign ministers of Hungary and Belarus publicly called for the start of peace talks, and Minsk reiterated its offer to mediate these negotiations. Other statements by the Hungarian official: Budapest does not support the EU sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus; the European sanctions policy has failed; the European economy has lost a lot because of its own sanctions; Hungary is interested in developing bilateral relations with Belarus, etc. The Hungarian official asked his Belarusian counterpart “to do everything possible to end the war in Ukraine as soon as possible”. Due to Hungary’s deadlock on Ukraine, there is a possibility that the accession negotiations of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova will be formally opened de jure in the last days of the Belgian Presidency-in-Office, in order to avoid postponing the formal start of negotiations during Hungary’s Presidency-in-Office of the EU Council (1 July – 31 December 2024). However, such a decision also requires a Hungarian vote.
The Russian military has stepped up its air strikes on targets on Ukrainian territory that can be used for the deployment and use of future F-16 aircraft that Ukraine will receive from its Western partners. According to Russian bloggers and the Moscow press, the Russian air force is carrying out increasingly frequent and effective bombing raids on infrastructure targets that Ukraine intends to use for the deployment and use of F-16 aircraft (when they are delivered to Kiev by its Western “F-16 Coalition” partners); the Iavoriv airfield in the Lviv region (where a command centre in the airfield’s bunkers was hit), the Starokosteantinov airfield in the Hmelnytsky region, etc. have been hit recently with Kinjal missiles.
The NATO summit in the US will not be historic for Ukraine. US officials mention possible new formulations for Ukraine at the July NATO Summit in Washington. Some member states are arguing for the adoption/use in the final communiqué of the meeting of terms that meet Ukraine’s expectations as much as possible, including the term “invitation”, even in an ambiguous formulation. It is possible that the final communique will ambiguously mention milestones of a “roadmap” for NATO membership after the end of the war. The final form of the communiqué will continue to be negotiated, including during the de facto Summit. NATO may appoint a special permanent representative for Ukraine. Ukraine will not receive an invitation to join at the Summit. There will be some wording in the final communiqué to respond both to Ukraine’s need for developments since previous meetings and to the Alliance’s need to send a further strong message to the Russian Federation on this occasion.
II. Code Reds
Possible developments and escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. Western experts anticipate that French President Emmanuel Macron is likely to order in the coming weeks (even days) the dispatch of military personnel to Ukraine, with a public assumption of such support for Ukraine – military trainers, non-combat troops, small numbers, ad hoc tasks and missions, etc. It is also likely that France’s example will be followed by countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, even Poland – it is possible that the dispatch of military trainers to Ukraine will be announced as an activity of a multinational coalition. Their main mission could be to train troops on the ground in various fields (operation of Western armaments, development of military infrastructure, guarding of targets, demining, military medicine, etc.) The mandate would be a national one, based on bilateral agreements concluded by these countries with Ukraine (in the case of France, the recent Security Cooperation Agreement signed with Ukraine, and the measure would be adopted in response to an express request from the Kiev authorities), without any legal or political effect on NATO’s commitment as an alliance. The French press headlines that the French President’s announcement could be made on 6 June this year (the day the Allies landed in Normandy), in the presence of Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski. Possible reaction of the Russian Federation: the Russian President made it clear in Tashkent that his armed forces will strike enemy targets within their range on Ukrainian territory; Russian forces may try one-off operations to liquidate some of these (French/foreign) troops in order to inhibit further dispatches of military personnel from other states. The likely decision of the French President may have some consequences for the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, but it is a measure with immediate political and military effect, necessary for Ukraine in the current critical context created by the continued tactical initiative of Russian troops on the front in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Moscow does not believe in peace. International media are persistently spreading the rumor that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in concluding a truce that would temporarily freeze the positions of the parties along the current front in eastern and southern Ukraine. It is certain that, despite the tactical initiative on the front, even the Russian Federation’s reserves (human, military, technical-military, logistical, economic, etc.) are not in a position to support the current (staging) objectives of the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine; in this context, the Russian Federation is theoretically interested in agreeing on a tactical and/or operational pause to be used as an operational pause to replenish resources. On the other hand, Ukraine’s fatigue appears to be greater, and the Russian tactical initiative is evidence of resources that appear to be greater than Ukraine’s at this point. In this context, it is unlikely that the alleged call for a ceasefire was made by the Kremlin or that it is in Russia’s interests at this time. Rather, Moscow is interested in developing its hybrid operations that seem to be having some effect in democratic countries (the rise of populism and extremist forces) as well as in countries in the wider Black Sea region (the overlapping turmoil in the Caucasus), simultaneously with the tactical initiative on the Ukrainian front, where attempts to disperse Ukrainian forces are increasingly diverse and frequent.
Russian punishment for disobedience has already reached Yerevan. Street protests of an unprecedented scale in recent years, public calls for actions of civic disobedience, public disorder, arrests, etc. mark a new political crisis in Yerevan, where, in the context of Armenia’s attempts to break out of the Russian sphere of influence, the “Russian footprint” in organising or encouraging these protests is evident. Protesters are calling for the resignation of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian in the context of the territorial concessions and arrangements accompanying the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation process. The links with the Orthodox Church of some of the leaders of the protest movement, the “Tavus in the Name of the Motherland” Movement (Archbishop Bagrat Galstanian), further confirm Moscow’s involvement in the organisation of these protests. The primary objective of the protests in Yerevan is the removal from office of the current Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pushkin (following the civic model he also patented – street movements, calls for acts of civil disobedience, etc.), whose actions to remove Armenia from Russian influence run counter to Russia’s interests in the Caucasus and are a source of massive discontent to Moscow. There is a strong likelihood of a “Russian fingerprint” in the organisation and manipulation of these protests.
The Georgian dream awakens sleeping consciences. The final adoption of the “Law on Transparency of Financing of Foreign Influence” by the Georgian Parliament following the presidential veto override has triggered new reactions from the international community and new domestic protests. Ursula von der Leyen said that all options would be considered. External positions have been more reserved; in general, European officials stress that Georgia still has a democratic chance to come back on this law, especially in view of the parliamentary elections on 26 October this year. The adoption of this law confirms the increase of Russian influence in Georgia and will also be a central issue in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Most likely, the international community will send out messages that the political authors of the Law (“Georgian Dream”) will not be welcome in the upcoming election campaigns. The Georgian President is talking (amid suspicions that Georgian Dream is hijacking Georgia’s European path) about a possible national referendum on EU membership (along the lines of Moldova), but Georgian Dream officials are contesting this initiative and will use all the instruments of power at their disposal to block it.
Russia’s games in the Balkans will become more radical. Milorad Dodik, the leader of Republika Srpska (Serb entity / part of Bosnia and Herzegovina / BiH), has decided to convene a “Serb People’s Assembly” on 8 June this year, at which he will resume the initiative of a so-called “peaceful (civilised) divorce” from BiH, a concept that connotes the explicit denunciation of the Serb entity’s membership of BiH. Serbian officials in Banja Luka appear to be strongly supported in this by Belgrade and Moscow. Milorad Dodik recently met Serbian President Alexandr Vucic in Belgrade to discuss the extent, level and limits of Serbian support for the new secessionist project of the Serbian entity leaders. Dodik’s new initiative is motivated by the recent adoption by the UN General Assembly of a resolution recognising the Srebrenica massacre as genocide. Today, the Dayton Agreement unequivocally establishes the Serb entity’s membership of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the compromises that ended the 1992-1995 war. The international community rejects Dodik’s new secessionist moves and warns that their implementation would mean the end of the “independence” of the Serb entity, which “exists only as part of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Although only rhetorically proposed, Moscow is one of the ideological backers of Milorad Dodik’s secessionist efforts, which have intensified in the context of new positive developments regarding BiH’s rapprochement with the EU.
III. Grey Alerts
In the short term, medium intensity alerts concern: 6 June – possible announcement by the President of France to send military instructors to Ukraine; 8 June – “Serbian People’s Assembly” in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, BiH; 6-9 June, European Parliament elections – Russian Federation hybrid actions in EU countries; continuation of Russian Federation hybrid actions to destabilise the political situation in some countries of the region, with priority to Moldova, Georgia and Armenia.
IV. Black Swans
Breaking up of the front in the south and east of Ukraine; one side taking over the strategic initiative.