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Putin’s troops hit as Ukraine enters Russia’s Belgorod region for first time
MS DAILY BRIEF – APRIL 9 th, 2025
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Content
Iran says talks with US will be indirect, contrary to Trump’s claims. 1
Trump confirms 104% tariffs on Chinese goods as part of ongoing global trade war. 3
Ukraine war briefing: Zelenskyy demands answers on Chinese nationals fighting for Russia 5
Two Chinese nationals caught fighting for Russia in Ukraine, Zelenskyy says. 5
How Trump’s tariffs could push Vietnam into China’s arms. 7
China retaliates after Pete Hegseth called the country a threat to the Panama Canal 8
EU urged to put human rights center stage at first Central Asia summit 10
US backs deal with Diego Garcia for 99 years of rent-free access. 14
NATO’s top US admiral has been ousted amid Trump’s growing military dismissals. 15
Marine Corps introduces drone strike team.. 16
A $1 trillion defense budget? Trump and Hegseth say it’s happening. 17
“Secretary-level and above” officials “working” on F/A-XX fighter jet decision: INTERIM NOC 17
Navy’s hands-in-pockets experiment under review, admiral says. 18
Crucible: Collapse of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in war or survival through peace?. 19
Unifying the arenas V.S. fragmenting the arenas – SOURCE RUSSIA.. 20
US Navy accepts anti-mine USVs from Bollinger. 23
Anduril introduces Copperhead: an underwater kamikaze drone inspired by torpedoes. 24
The rules-based global trading system is largely irrelevant 25
Desert Storm: China’s Gobi missile salvo, a message to the US – April 8, 2025. 27
When troops return home to Russia and Ukraine – April 8, 2025. 29
Greece pledges $27 billion for defense overhaul centered on high-tech warfare. 33
France calls for new EU munitions plan, accelerating satellite constellation. 34
In Odessa, many wonder about the benefits of a Black Sea ceasefire with Russia – April 7, 2025 36
The case for a British sub-strategic nuclear deterrent – April 7, 2025. 38
How the Houthis fooled Washington – April 8, 2025. 41
What Latin America can teach Trump about tariffs – April 8, 2025. 42
Update from Ukraine | Ukraine Captured Chinese Mercenaries | Russia continues to lose BMPs and tanks
Iran says talks with US will be indirect, contrary to Trump’s claims
US president pursued ‘direct talks’ and said Iran would be in ‘great danger’ if they fail
Patrick Wintour Diplomatic Editor
Tue Apr 8 2025 18.52 18.52 CEST
Iran, misled by Donald Trump’s revelation that “direct talks” between the US and Iran over its nuclear program will begin on Saturday in Oman, insisted that the talks will actually be in an indirect format, but added that the negotiators’ intentions are more important than the format.
On Monday, Trump took Tehran by surprise, unveiling the plan for the talks at the end of the week and saying that if the talks fail, Iran would be in “great danger”. There has been an unprecedented US military buildup in the Middle East in recent weeks, and Trump’s decision to make the talks public appears designed to pressure Iran to negotiate urgently.
The US delegation to the talks will be led by Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, who has also been involved in talks with Russia over the war in Ukraine; and the Iranian side by its foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi. Witkoff’s efforts to broker peace between Israel and Hamas and between Russia and Ukraine have so far failed.
Iran has publicly prevaricated about the talks, saying only that it is ready for indirect talks with the US, but has yet to receive an official response from the US on whether talks will continue. In a post on X published hours after Trump used an Oval Office press conference to unveil the agreement to hold talks over the weekend, Araghchi described the talks as an opportunity and a test. He insisted the ball is in the US court.
Speaking during a visit to Algiers, Araghchi detailed that Iran wanted indirect talks. He said, “The form of negotiations is not important, whether they are direct or indirect. In my opinion, what is important is whether the negotiations are effective or ineffective, whether the parties are serious or not in the negotiations, the intentions of the parties in the negotiations and the will to reach a solution. These are the criteria for action in any dialog.”
He added that Iran has not agreed on a formula that would allow the indirect talks to evolve into direct talks, but the US expects the talks to evolve into a direct negotiation. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has vetoed direct talks in protest at US sanctions and in deference to hardliners who see talks with the US on Tehran’s nuclear program as a political trap.
Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani welcomed the news of the talks and said that if the 2015 nuclear deal had been concluded indirectly, it would have lasted 20 years instead of two.
Trump withdrew from that deal – known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – during his first term. That agreement offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for limiting its uranium enrichment activities.
Iran is waiting to see whether Trump will be satisfied if the talks focus on a new system of oversight of its civilian nuclear program, not unlike the treaty from which Trump withdrew the US in 2018; or whether the US will instead seek to dismantle Iran’s entire nuclear program, a step that has increasingly been referred to as the Libya option. In December 2003, Libya’s longtime leader, Muammar Gaddafi, renounced the country’s weapons of mass destruction program and allowed international inspectors to verify that Tripoli would honor its commitment.
On Monday, speaking alongside Trump in the Oval Office, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu backed Libya’s option, but Iran insists it will not abandon its civilian nuclear program. Ultimately, Israel does not trust Iran and expects negotiations to fail. In this case, Israel favors an American-Israeli military strike to destroy Iranian nuclear sites.
But Witkoff, in an interview with Tucker Carlson three weeks ago, suggested that Trump’s demands toward Iran might be relatively modest. He said Trump, in his letter requesting talks with Iran, said, “We should clear up misconceptions. We should create a verification program so that no one worries about arming your nuclear material. And I would like to get to this point, because the alternative is not a very good one. This is a rough encapsulation of what has been said.”
But Trump is under pressure to reach a deal that is more watertight than the one struck by Barack Obama in 2015.
Predicting Iran’s position in the talks, Araghchi said, “Iran’s nuclear program is completely peaceful and legitimate. UN Security Council resolution 2231 has just confirmed its legitimacy. There is no doubt about it at the international level. If anyone has questions or ambiguities, we are ready to clarify them. We are confident that our nuclear program is peaceful, and we have no problem building confidence in that, unless it creates a limitation for us or is an obstacle to Iran’s objectives.”
Iran has always insisted that there is a fatwa against building nuclear weapons, but senior Iranian politicians, faced with a series of military failures, have increasingly disputed this.
Iran also faces the threat that Trump has set a two-month deadline – which expires in May – for talks to reach a result. Iran, being the consummate negotiator that it is, could test Trump’s patience, especially if Witkoff eventually demands that its ballistic-weapons program and financial support for militant forces also be put on the agenda.
A February report by the International Atomic Energy Agency found that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium enriched to 60 percent purity has risen sharply since December. Experts say it is relatively easy from this point to reach 90% enrichment – the threshold for weapons-grade material. As of February 8, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% had risen by 92.5 kg from the previous quarter to 274.8 kg. Iran says the stockpile is in response to US sanctions.
Trump confirms 104% tariffs on Chinese goods as part of ongoing global trade war
Beijing vows to ‘fight to the end’ as president says ‘many’ countries seek deal with US
Callum Jones in Washington, Helen Davidson in Taipei, Lauren Almeida in London
Tue Apr 8 2025 19.44 19.44 CEST
Donald Trump is poised to unleash his trade war with the world on Wednesday, pressing ahead with a series of tariffs on the US’s biggest trading partners despite fears of widespread economic damage and calls for reconsideration.
The US president has said “many” countries are trying to reach an agreement with Washington as his administration prepares to impose draconian tariffs on goods from dozens of markets from Wednesday.
However, Beijing has vowed to “fight to the bitter end” after Trump threatened to slap Chinese exports with additional tariffs of 50 percent if the country follows through on its plans to retaliate against his initial pledge to impose 34 percent tariffs on its goods. That would add to the existing 20% tariff and bring the total tariff on Chinese imports to 104%.
The White House has confirmed that higher US tariffs on China will indeed be imposed from Wednesday. “President Trump has a backbone of steel and he will not yield,” said press secretary Karoline Leavitt. “And America will not yield under his leadership.”
Trump’s billionaire adviser Elon Musk has also reportedly urged the president to reverse course, and the New Civil Liberties Alliance, a libertarian group funded by organizations affiliated with conservative businessmen Leonard Leo and Charles Koch, has filed a lawsuit against the “illegal” tariffs.
The latest tariffs are higher than the 10% flat rate imposed last week Friday on all global imports into the US and are tailored to specific countries based on a formula criticized by economists, which divides the deficit on trade in goods by twice the total value of imports.
After days of turmoil since they were first unveiled last week, global markets initially recovered some ground on Tuesday as senior US officials sought to reassure investors that the new tariffs – including rates of 20% for the European Union, 26% for India and 49% for Cambodia – could be temporary.
But the rebound didn’t last long. On Wall Street, the benchmark S&P 500 index closed down 1.6% at 4,982.77 – below 5,000 for the first time in more than a year – while the Dow Jones industrial average fell 0.8%. The tech-focused Nasdaq Composite was also under pressure, falling 2.2%.
Earlier in the day, the FTSE 100 index rose 2.7% in London, recovering some of the losses suffered since Trump’s announcement last week, dubbed “liberation day ” by his aides. The Nikkei 225 index rose 6% in Tokyo. The Hang Seng index rose 1.5% in Hong Kong.
Scott Bessent, the US treasury secretary, insisted the new tariffs were at “maximum” levels and expressed confidence that the negotiations would reduce them.
“I think you’re going to see some very large countries with very large trade deficits [with the US] come forward very quickly,” he told financial news network CNBC on Tuesday. “If they come to the table with solid proposals, I think we can reach some good agreements.”
Trump was asked Monday whether the tariffs pave the way for negotiations with countries or are permanent. “Well, both can be true,” he told reporters. “There can be permanent tariffs and there can also be negotiations.”
But he raised the prospect of deals with countries again on Tuesday, eyeing a potential agreement with South Korea.
“Their top TEAM is on a plane heading to the USA, and things are looking good,” Trump wrote on his social platform Truth. “We are also dealing with many other countries, all wanting to make a deal with the United States.”
The president added: “‘ONE STOP SHOPPING’ is a beautiful and effective process!!! China also very much wants to make a deal, but doesn’t know how to get started. We await their call. It will happen!”
Rachel Reeves, the UK chancellor, tried to allay concerns about market volatility, telling parliament that she had spoken to Andrew Bailey, governor of the Bank of England, who confirmed that “markets are working efficiently and our banking system is resilient”.
A trade war “is in nobody’s interest”, Reeves argued, confirming that the UK is trying to negotiate a new deal with the US. Trump has imposed a 10% tariff on British exports, in line with the baseline minimum introduced at the weekend.
She refused to back Liberal Democrat calls for the government to launch a “buy British” campaign. “In terms of buying British, I think everyone will make their own decisions,” Reeves said. “What we don’t want to see is a trade war with Britain becoming closed in on itself.”
China took an entirely different stance. In a trenchant editorial, the official state-run Xinhua accused the US president of “naked blackmail”.
“Absolutely absurd is the basic logic of the United States: ‘I can hit you as I please, and you don’t have to respond. Instead, you must surrender unconditionally,'” she said. “This is not diplomacy. This is brutal coercion dressed up as politics.”
A 1987 speech by Ronald Reagan, posted by China’s foreign ministry, has been widely circulated on social media. The video clip, in which the former US president criticizes the use of tariffs as leading to retaliation and ultimately hurting the US economy, “has a new significance in 2025,” Chinese newspaper The Paper said.
Bessent argued Tuesday that China is making a “big mistake” by daring to retaliate. “They are playing with a pair of twos,” he argued on CNBC. “What do we lose if the Chinese raise tariffs on us? We export to them a fifth of what they export to us, so it’s a losing hand for them.”
This article was amended on April 8, 2025 to clarify that a lawsuit against the tariffs was filed by the New Civil Liberties Alliance, a group that was funded by organizations affiliated with Leonard Leo and Charles Koch, rather than the businessmen themselves.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/08/trump-global-tariffs
Ukraine war briefing: Zelenskyy demands answers on Chinese nationals fighting for Russia
Ukrainian president says Chinese citizens were just two of many fighting alongside Russian forces. What we know on Day 1,141
Guardian staff and agencies
Wed Apr 9 2025 02.32 02.32 CEST
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his government is seeking clarification from Beijing after Ukrainian forces captured two Chinese nationals fighting with Russian forces in eastern Donetsk.
- Zelenskyy said the captured fighters were two of many Chinese members of the Russian armed forces and accused the Kremlin of trying to involve Beijing in the conflict “directly or indirectly”. Several hundred Chinese nationals are believed to have traveled to fight as mercenaries with the Russian military, along with others from Nepal and Central Asian countries.
- US State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce , called the development “worrying”, adding: “China is a major supporter of Russia in the war in Ukraine.”
- Russian forces staged massive drone strikes on the Ukrainian cities of Dnipro and Kharkiv late Tuesday, setting fires and wounding at least 17 people, regional officials said. In eastern Donetsk, the focal point of the 1,000-kilometer (600-mile) frontline in the more than three-year war, a residential area was attacked in the town of Kramatorsk, and local officials said residents were wounded. In Dnipro, the attack sparked a fire, damaged houses and cars and wounded 14 people, Serhiy Lysak, governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, said on Telegram.
- Russia says it is close to regaining full control of its western Kursk region, after pushing Ukrainian forces from one of their last footholds there. The Russian Defense Ministry released video footage of what it said was the recapture of the Guyevo settlement, set to dramatic music showing smoke rising into the air from various buildings, a soldier waving the Russian flag from the window of a badly damaged Orthodox church and Russian troops conducting house-to-house checks for hiding Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian officials have not commented on Russia’s allegations, but its General Staff said in a statement that its planes struck a complex of hangars and military buildings in the region, used by Russian drone operators and maintenance workers.
- The US Senate confirmed the appointment of Elbridge Colby as the Pentagon’s top policy adviser, despite concerns that he has downplayed threats from Russia and Vladimir Putin. Colby questioned whether Russia had actually invaded Ukraine, echoing a false Kremlin view. After dodging repeated questions about whether he believes Russia invaded the country, he was forced to agree that it did.
- American and Russian delegates will hold talks in Istanbul on Thursday on restoring some of the operations of their embassies that have been drastically scaled back following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the US State Department confirmed.
Two Chinese nationals caught fighting for Russia in Ukraine, Zelenskyy says
Ukrainian president says men’s capture shows Moscow is trying to involve Beijing in war ‘directly or indirectly’
Dan Sabbagh in Kiev
Tue Apr 8 2025 16.45 16.45 CEST
Ukrainian forces have captured two Chinese nationals fighting with the Russian army in eastern Donetsk region, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The Ukrainian president said they were two of many other Chinese who are part of the Russian armed forces and accused the Kremlin of trying to involve Beijing in the conflict “directly or indirectly”.
Zelenskyy said he would ask his foreign minister “to immediately contact Beijing and clarify how China intends to respond to this situation,” although it was not clear whether the captured soldiers were sent at the behest of their government or were individuals who had chosen to enlist on their own.
Several hundred Chinese nationals are believed to have traveled to fight as mercenaries with the Russian army, along with others from Nepal and Central Asian countries. Their status appears to be different from that of the 11,000 North Korean soldiers who were deployed to the frontline after a political agreement between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Zelenskyy said that identity documents, bank cards and personal data had been found in the possession of the two captured men and that his country’s internal security agency, the SBU, was “verifying all the facts”.
He argued that the capture of the two men indicates that Russia is not interested in accepting a ceasefire in the US-brokered peace talks, which have made only limited progress in the past two months.
“Russia’s involvement in China, along with other countries, directly or indirectly, in this war in Europe is a clear signal that Putin intends to do anything short of ending the war. He is looking for ways to continue fighting,” Zelenskyy wrote on social media.
He said the development “definitely requires a response” from the US, Europe and “everyone around the world who wants peace”. There was no immediate reaction from Moscow or Beijing.
Below his post on X, Zelenskyy published a short video purportedly showing a captured soldier, his hands bound, speaking in Mandarin. Prisoners of war are protected from public curiosity under the Geneva Conventions and their images should not be published online.
China says it is a neutral party in the conflict. Russia largely uses Chinese-made components in its arms industry, and Ukraine does the same to some extent. Both sides make significant use of Mavic drones from Chinese manufacturer DJI, although Kiev is trying to reduce its reliance on Beijing products.
Western sources said it was too early to reach definitive conclusions about those captured. But one official said that so far “we don’t see evidence of state sponsorship here,” indicating an initial belief that the captured soldiers acted on their own initiative.
Individuals from some 70 countries, including the US, Britain and other European countries, have served in the Ukrainian military. Some units, such as the Azov brigade, have actively sought to recruit foreigners to bolster depleted forces after more than three years of war.
How Trump’s tariffs could push Vietnam into China’s arms
Rebecca RatcliffeSoutheast Asia correspondent
The move sent shockwaves through a strategically important US region that had respected Trump as tough on Beijing
Tue Apr 8 2025 14.47 14.47 CEST
Vietnam has tried to appease Donald Trump: tariffs on US goods have been reduced; regulations have been passed to allow Elon Musk’s SpaceX to launch Elon Musk’s Starlink in the country. The prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, even joked in January that he would be happy to “play golf all day” at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago, Florida, home if it would “benefit my country and my people”.
The strategies don’t seem to have worked. Trump has imposed an extraordinary 46 percent tariff on Vietnam that threatens to devastate its economic growth plans and undermine relations between the two countries. The tariff has sent shockwaves through Vietnam, a manufacturing power in which Trump has always been quite popular, and Southeast Asia.
Across the region, which is heavily dependent on exports, Trump is introducing similarly punitive tariffs, including in Cambodia (49%), Laos (48%), Thailand (36%), Indonesia (32%), Malaysia (24%), Brunei (24%), the Philippines (17%) and Singapore (10%).
The announcement has damaged the US reputation as a reliable partner in the region, said Kevin Chen, a research associate in the US program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. The Trump administration’s approach has been “one-sided, coercive and undermines the trade system under which countries in the region have thrived,” Chen said.
Southeast Asia is a region of strategic importance to the US, particularly in the context of Washington’s competition with China and tensions in the South China Sea.
Vietnam and the US grew closer under Trump’s predecessor Joe Biden, with the two countries improving their partnership. Trump is known to be well-liked in Vietnam, where his books are translated into Vietnamese, and has gained respect as a businessman and as a tough politician toward China.
However, US relations with Southeast Asia have been undermined in recent months. The tariff announcement comes on top of the dismantling of USAID and other foreign assistance programs, which have halted vital projects across the region.
America’s image has also taken a hit in recent years in countries such as Malaysia and Muslim-majority Indonesia because of Washington’s support for Israel during the Gaza war. US companies have been targeted by prolonged boycotts in both countries.
China is expected to try to take advantage of the chaos. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, is due to visit Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia this month and “is likely to seize the opportunity to present China as a firm and reliable partner in contrast to the US,” Chen said. A number of economic agreements are expected to be signed between China and these countries by the end of his visit.
In the longer term, whether China can capitalize on the frustration in Southeast Asia is less clear, analysts say, especially as Beijing risks becoming embroiled in a deepening trade war with its superpower rival.
Trump has threatened China with an additional 50% tariff, which will exacerbate the economic difficulties already affecting the dynamic between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors.
Peter Mumford, head of the Southeast Asia practice at Eurasia Group, said the region “is facing an avalanche of low-cost Chinese goods, and this is only going to get more complicated”. The oversupply of cheap goods, from clothing to steel, has hurt small businesses and contributed to the closure of hundreds of factories in Thailand.
Southeast Asian leaders will try to diversify by looking to Europe or Japan, analysts say, while trying to negotiate with Trump.
It’s unclear what countries like Vietnam can offer to appease Washington. Vietnam’s trade surplus with the US has topped $123 billion, a figure that has grown rapidly in recent years as companies have moved there from China to avoid tariffs imposed by the previous Trump administration.
“Trump would likely push Vietnam to commit to buying far more American goods and services. As Vietnam has been considered a channel through which China can circumvent US tariffs, the Trump administration could also ask Vietnam to restrict the transshipment of Chinese goods,” said Phan Dung, research officer of the Vietnam Studies Program at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
Vietnam is doing its best to negotiate to persuade the US to reduce tariffs, said Khang Vu, a visiting scholar in the political science department at Boston College. But, he added, US tariffs would “hurt the Vietnamese government’s goodwill toward the Trump administration.”
He said Trump’s tariffs on Vietnamese goods showed Hanoi that, despite everything Washington has said about Vietnam’s regional importance, their partnership is “dispensable.”
Countries in the region will be wary of getting too close to China, already Southeast Asia’s biggest trading partner. In the past, the US has served as a counterbalance in the region. “The major difference this time,” Chen said, “is that they will have to take into account potential US unfriendliness, if not hostility, as well as an assertive China.”
China retaliates after Pete Hegseth called the country a threat to the Panama Canal
Chinese government asks “Who is the real threat?” After US defense secretary vows to keep canal safe
Associated Press
Wed Apr 9 2025 02.23 02.23 CEST
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Tuesday that the Panama Canal faces ongoing threats from China but that together the United States and Panama will keep it safe.
Hegseth’s remarks triggered a fiery response from the Chinese government, which said, “Who is the real threat to the canal? People will make up their own minds.
Speaking at the ribbon-cutting for a new US-funded dock at the Vasco Nuñez de Balboa naval base after a meeting with Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino, Hegseth said the US would not allow China or any other country to threaten the canal’s operation.
“To that end, the United States and Panama have done more in recent weeks to strengthen our defense and security cooperation than in decades,” he said.
Hegseth alluded to ports at both ends of the canal that are controlled by a Hong Kong-based consortium that is in the process of selling its majority stake to another consortium that includes BlackRock Inc.
“China-based companies continue to control critical infrastructure in the canal zone,” Hegseth said. “This gives China the potential to conduct surveillance activities in Panama. This makes Panama and the United States less safe, less prosperous and less sovereign. And as President Donald Trump has emphasized, this is not acceptable.”
Hegseth met with Mulino for two hours on Tuesday morning before heading to the naval base that had previously been the U.S. Naval Station Rodman.
Along the way, Hegseth posted a photo on Twitter/X of the two men laughing and said it was an honor to speak with Mulino. “Your and your country’s hard work is making a difference. Increased security cooperation will make both our nations safer, stronger and more prosperous,” he wrote.
The visit comes amid tensions over Donald Trump’s repeated claims that the US is being overcharged for using the Panama Canal and that China has influence over its operations – allegations Panama has denied.
Shortly after the meeting, the Chinese embassy in Panama criticized the US government in a statement on X, saying that the US used “blackmail” to advance its own interests and that who Panama does business with is a “sovereign decision of Panama … and something the US has no right to interfere in.”
“The U.S. has run a sensationalized campaign on the ‘theoretical Chinese threat’ in an attempt to sabotage Sino-Panamanian cooperation, which is only rooted in the U.S.’s own geopolitical interests,” the embassy wrote.
After Hegseth and Mulino spoke by phone in February, the US State Department said an agreement had been reached not to charge US warships fees to pass through the canal. Mulino has publicly denied the existence of any such deal.
The US president went so far as to suggest that the US should never have given up the Panama Canal and that perhaps it should take the canal back.
China’s concern was provoked by the Hong Kong consortium that holds a 25-year lease for the ports at both ends of the canal. The Panamanian government announced that the lease was being audited, and late on Monday concluded that there were irregularities.
However, the Hong Kong-based consortium has already announced that CK Hutchison will sell its majority stake in the ports to a consortium that includes BlackRock Inc, effectively putting the ports under US control once the sale is finalized.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Mulino during a February visit that Trump believes China’s presence in the canal zone could violate a treaty that prompted the US to surrender the Panama waterway in 1999. That treaty provides for the permanent neutrality of the US-built canal.
Mulino has denied that China has any influence in the canal’s operations. In February, he expressed frustration at the persistence of that claim. “We will not talk about what is not reality, but rather about those issues that are of interest to both countries,” he said.
The US built the canal in the early 1900s, seeking ways to facilitate the transit of commercial and military ships between their coasts. Washington ceded control of the waterway to Panama on December 31, 1999, under a 1977 treaty signed by Jimmy Carter.
“I want to be very clear, China did not build this canal,” Hegseth said Tuesday. “China is not operating this canal and China will not arm this canal. Together with Panama at the forefront, we will keep the canal secure and available to all nations through the deterrent power of the world’s most powerful, most effective and most lethal fighting force.”
,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/08/pete-hegseth-china-panama-canal
EU urged to put human rights center stage at first Central Asia summit
The bloc will discuss trade, security and energy with leaders from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
Jennifer Rankin in Brussels
Friday April 4, 2025 04.00 04.00 CEST
The EU is being urged to put human rights center stage as it begins its first summit with Central Asian leaders.
European Council President António Costa and European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen meet leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on Friday.
Hosted by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the group will discuss trade relations, counter-terrorism, climate and energy in Samarkand, a stop on the ancient Silk Road that linked Asia to the West and is now a symbol of rapid development in the region.
EU ties with the former Soviet republics in Central Asia have intensified since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The two sides have pledged to improve transport links through a project known as the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, which aims to halve overland travel between the EU and Central Asia to no more than 15 days. Brussels also hopes to approve a text on critical raw materials that are plentiful in the region and needed for the EU’s green transition.
A senior EU official said it had been “a historic summit” and that the Central Asian countries had shown “a corresponding desire to deepen their relationship with the EU and diversify their foreign policy”.
Before the summit, the most complex issue – for Central Asian countries – was how to refer to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the final declaration. Kazakhstan, once one of Russia’s close allies, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, maintained contact with Volodymyr Zelenskyy and banned symbols of Russian military propaganda. However, Kazakhstan joined Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in abstaining from a recent UN General Assembly vote calling for a “peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine”.
The European Parliament has also expressed concern that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are “possible hubs” for Russia to circumvent Western sanctions.
Amid shifting geopolitical alliances and the battle for mineral wealth, campaigners urge the EU not to neglect human rights.
“These new partnerships are very important, but they will not be sustainable and will not really secure the EU’s interests unless the EU is also concerned about the rule of law in the region and the protection of rights,” said Iskra Kirova of Human Rights Watch.
The EU, she added, is not using its influence in a credible way. She questioned the EU’s decision to sign a wide-ranging trade and cooperation agreement with Kyrgyzstan last June, after Bishkek passed a Russian-style law on “foreign representatives” requiring NGOs receiving funds from abroad to bear this designation. The law stigmatizes organizations and has had a “very scary effect” on Kyrgyz civil society, Kirova said.
The EU “is not insisting that there will be concrete achievements before granting this kind of direct benefits or bilateral agreements,” she said, also referring to preferential trade agreements.
A senior EU official said that following EU intervention, a plan for criminal sanctions in Kyrgyzstan’s original draft law on NGOs had been dropped, adding that this was “a major difference” from similar laws in Russia and Belarus. “We are not going there to preach,” said a second official. “But the more we have more dialog, engagement and interaction, the more we believe we can change and improve all the things we are concerned about.”
Maisy Weicherding, of Amnesty International, said the EU must lead by example by ensuring that “human rights due diligence” is part of any infrastructure project, listing actions that include environmental and climate impact assessments, consulting local people and ensuring there is no forced displacement.
Such due diligence would be crucial in Uzbekistan, she said, where a UN special rapporteur found in 2024 that large numbers of people had been forced from their homes to make way for large-scale redevelopment. “It is really imperative that [the EU] does not go and endorse repressive practices in these countries, but tries to insist on respect for due process on human rights.”
Summit host Mirziyoyev became president of Uzbekistan in 2016 after the death of dictator Islam Karimov. He introduced reforms, including cracking down on forced labor in cotton fields. Human rights groups say his government does not allow dissent , and the vote remains tightly controlled, as was the case in a recent referendum that introduced constitutional changes that will allow Mirziyoyev to stay in power until 2040.
Jana Toom, vice chair of the European Parliament’s delegation for Central Asia, said that Central Asian countries are not doing enough to stop the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia, although she added that they have not made any commitment to do so.
Asked whether the EU was striking the right balance between economic interests and human rights, the Estonian Liberal MEP said: “I believe that if we have beneficial cooperation between the European Union and Central Asia, things will improve. It will take time, of course. And we also have to take into account that it is between Russia and China and they are trying to find a balance”.
h ttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/04/eu-urged-to-put-human-rights-centre-stage-at-first-central-asia-summit
South Korean Aegis destroyer Aegis King Sejong the Great, front, sails with the USS Barry, left, and Japanese destroyer Atago during joint exercises on Feb. 22, 2023.
America’s largest military shipbuilder has signed a deal with a South Korean company that experts say could be a big step in helping the US Navy build new warships to keep up with rival China in fleet size.
HII (Huntington Ingalls Industries) of Virginia and South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) Monday at a defense exhibition in Maryland.
“Today’s agreement reflects our commitment to explore all opportunities to expand U.S. shipbuilding capabilities in support of national security,” HII Executive Vice President Brian Blanchette said at a ceremony at the Sea Air Space 2025 exhibition.
“Working with our shipbuilding allies and sharing best practices, we believe this memorandum of understanding offers real potential to help accelerate the delivery of quality ships.”
A statement from Hyundai Heavy Industries noted that both HII and the South Korean shipyard are building Aegis destroyers, the backbone of the US and South Korean surface fleets. Aegis ships offer protection against missile threats, including powerful ballistic missiles in the arsenals of rivals China and North Korea.
“This memorandum of understanding is particularly significant as it marks the first collaboration between two leading Korean and US shipbuilding companies, both of which have the capability to build the world’s most advanced Aegis ships,” the statement said.
Hyundai Heavy Industries operates the world’s largest shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea, and builds 10% of the world’s ships, according to the company’s website.
Analysts have long called for the US to take steps with allies like South Korea and Japan to cooperate on naval shipbuilding as Chinese shipyards have been churning out warships at breakneck speed, giving the People’s Liberation Army Navy the world’s largest fleet.
Meanwhile, Washington has failed to keep pace, due in large part to limited capacity in shipyard space and insufficient workers in the US.
“This agreement is a strong start towards alleviating the impact of America’s shortfall in shipbuilding capacity,” said Hawaii-based analyst Carl Schuster, a former US Navy captain.
US Navy Aegis destroyer USS Stethem Aegis destroyer USS Stethem docks at a military port in Shanghai in November 2015.
Schuster said that while changes in US law would be needed to allow the South Korean shipyard to start building full destroyers for the US Navy, the pact signed Monday could bring immediate benefits.
“The (U.S.) law does not prohibit the use of foreign shipyards to repair and do maintenance on U.S. Navy ships and we have a 36-month backlog of shipyard maintenance and hull refurbishment,” he said.
Another South Korean shipyard, Hanwha Ocean, last month completed a seven-month overhaul of a U.S. Military Sealift Command supply ship, the USNS Wally Schirra, a performance that a U.S. Navy admiral called a “landmark achievement.”
“Maintenance in theater reduces downtime and costs while improving operational readiness,” said Rear Adm. Neil Koprowski, commander of US Naval Forces Korea.
But cooperation between the Aegis destroyer builders takes the alliance to a higher level.
“We aim to enhance the shipbuilding capabilities and capacities of both nations and, in addition, contribute to strengthening bilateral security cooperation,” Joo Wonho, executive director of shipbuilding and special construction at Hyundai Heavy, said in a statement.
South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-weon called the agreement “a new model of cooperation between South Korea and the United States.”
“Given that Korean shipyards directly participate in the US naval power buildup, it is also expected to contribute to security cooperation between South Korea and the US, including efforts to keep China under control,” Yu said. ROK stands for Republic of Korea.
Schuster sees another big benefit from the deal.
“Hyundai and Huntington can use the agreement to train new U.S. workers for HII shipyards. The labor shortage is the main factor limiting America’s shipyard capacity,” he said.
If it can eventually be determined that warships for the US Navy could be built in South Korea, the impact could be even more substantial.
Woo-man Jeong, general manager of Hyundai Heavy’s specialized business division, told South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo last month that his company could build five or more Aegis destroyers a year. US shipyards average two or fewer destroyers built a year.
The HII-Hyundai deal follows a big investment in US shipbuilding last year by Hanwha Ocean, when it acquired Philly Shipyard, which mainly builds commercial ships but also does maintenance and repair work on government vessels.
Bence Nemeth, a senior lecturer at King’s College London, said after the Philly Shipyard deal that US-South Korea shipbuilding cooperation benefits the security of both countries.
“In the short term, the US Navy will benefit from increased availability of ships, and in the medium term, it could accelerate the growth of its fleet. This can help Washington maintain its global maritime dominance,” Nemeth wrote on the Korean Institute for Maritime Strategy website.
“A strong US navy is also crucial to South Korean national security as it helps deter North Korean aggression,” Nemeth said.
Source: here
US backs deal with Diego Garcia for 99 years of rent-free access
An agreement appears to be in the final stages of negotiations between Mauritius and Britain on the continued use of Diego Garcia, a key base for US naval and air operations in the Middle East and Africa. This follows President Trump’s approval of the detailed draft treaty, which was announced on April 1. Both the British and Mauritanian governments have indicated they are keen to finalize the treaty as soon as possible.
However, the UK’s Reform Party, which has been ahead of Labour and the Opposition Conservative Party in opinion polls for the past three months, vowed on April 6 that it would cancel any treaty signed if elected to power. Richard Tice, the party’s deputy leader, said in a televised interview that he was not surprised that the United States supported the agreement because it gave the United States free use of Diego Garcia for the next 99 years. The Reform Party “broke” the treaty on the basis that Mauritius had agreed to a deal in 1965 in which it accepted payment in exchange for giving up all future claims to the Chagos archipelago.
Analysts have in recent days identified B-2 Spirit long-range strategic bombers loaded with munitions on the Diego Garcia platform, indicating that the aircraft are being used in ongoing attacks against Houthi targets in Yemen. There are also reports that the United States is moving the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108) into position in the Chagos archipelago to bolster local air defenses in the face of the potential threat from Iran. The USS Wayne E. Meyer headed west from the Strait of Malacca and on April 3 was in the Indian Ocean.
Diego Garcia is the largest island in the Chagos Archipelago, part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). It has been used as a joint UK-US military base since the 1970s after the expulsion of the Chagossians by the UK government. The Chagos Islands had been a British overseas territory, but in early October 2024, the UK engaged in talks with Mauritius to transfer sovereignty of the islands, while allowing the military base to remain under a 99-year lease pending treaty ratification.
Located just south of the equator in the central Indian Ocean , Diego Garcia lies 3,535 km (2,197 mi) east of Tanzania , 2,984 km (1,854 mi) east-southeast of Somalia, 726 km (451 mi) south of the Maldives , 1. 796 km (southwest of India ) 2,877 km (1,788 mi) west-southwest of Sumatra, 4,723 km (2,935 mi) northwest of Australia and 2,112 km (1,312 mi) northeast of Mauritius. Diego Garcia is part of the Chagos-Laccadive Ridge, an underwater mountain rangethat includes Lakshadweep, the Maldives and the other 60 small islands of the Chagos Archipelago. The island observes UTC+6 all year round.
Diego Garcia was discovered by Portuguese sailors in 1512 and remained uninhabited until the French began using it as a leper colony and for coconut plantations in the late 18th century. After the Napoleonic Wars, the island was transferred to British control. It remained part of Mauritius until 1965, when it became part of the newly-formed BIOT.
In 1966, Diego Garcia had a population of 924, mostly contract workers employed on coconut plantations. However, between 1968 and 1973, Chagossian residents were forcibly removed to make way for the military base. In 2019, the International Court of Justice ruled that the United Kingdom’s administration of the Chagos Archipelago was illegal, a decision backed by the United Nations , although the UK dismissed the decision as non-binding.
Diego Garcia remains BIOT’s only inhabited island, with its population made up of military personnel and contractors. It is one of two critical US bomber bases in the Indo-Pacific region, along with Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. It is nicknamed “Freedom’s Footprint” by the US Navy due to its shape and strategic location in the Indian Ocean.
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NATO’s top US admiral has been ousted amid Trump’s growing military dismissals
Vice Adm. Shoshana Chatfield has been removed from her post at NATO (Navy).
Vice Adm. Shoshana Chatfield, a senior US military officer at NATO, has been fired as the Trump administration continues its widespread removal of senior uniformed officers, according to several US and European officials.
It is unclear whether the firing came from the Pentagon or the White House, which last week ousted several national security officials – including Gen. Timothy Haugh, head of the NSA and Cyber Command – after President Donald Trump met with far-right activist Laura Loomer.
Loomer later took credit for Haugh’s dismissal in a post on social media platform X.
Chatfield was America’s representative to NATO’s Military Committee, the alliance’s group of senior officials. The body advises NATO’s top military leaders and helps guide long-term strategy.
Brig. Gen. Sean Flynn, the deputy representative, will serve on an interim basis until a successor is named, a U.S. official said, as did others who were allowed to speak in the background to discuss the ouster.
Chatfield was previously the first woman to head the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Her tenure there later made her a target of conservative advocacy groups, one of which claimed she was too concerned about diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives, or DEI, in a December letter to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
The Pentagon did not respond to questions about why Chatfield was fired, who made the decision and whether other officers were affected. Reuters first reported Chatfield’s firing.
In its first few months, the Trump administration has overseen the rapid removal of top officers from the US military, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General CQ Brown, the chief of naval operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, and the deputy chief of the Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jim Slife.
So far, the firings have sparked public criticism from congressional Democrats, though lawmakers from both parties called Brown’s firing “unfortunate” last week at a confirmation hearing for retired Gen. Dan Caine, Trump’s pick for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The removal of a senior American officer from NATO has worried several European defense officials, who fear America is retreating from its role in the alliance. Gen. Christopher Cavoli, head of European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is set to retire this summer.
Source: here
Marine Corps introduces drone strike team
Timothy J. Brockup Jr. operates a Skydio X2D X2D drone at the Weapons Training Battalion at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, on March 7, 2025 (Capt. Joshua Barker / U.S. Marine Corps).
The U.S. Marine Corps is leading a new drone strike team in response to the proliferation of unmanned aerial combat internationally, according to the service.
The commanding general of the training command, Maj. Gen. Anthony M. Henderson, along with the commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Laboratory, Brig. Gen. Simon M. Doran, established the Marine Corps Attack Drone Team, or MCADT, on Jan. 3.
The team will focus on integrating first-person drones – aerial vehicles that transmit a live feed of their aerial view to remote displays – into the Marine Fleet Marine Force.
“Today’s battlefield is changing rapidly and we need to adapt just as quickly. The Marine Corps Attack Drone Attack Team will ensure our warfighters remain at the forefront of precision drone use, providing a critical advantage in future conflicts,” said Maj. Alejandro Tavizon, commanding company commander of the Weapons Training Battalion Command Company and MCADT officer in charge.
The team, headquartered at Weapons Training Battalion at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, is poised to “develop and refine” first-person armed drone training, accelerate the timeline for implementing the technology and provide training through live training events.
MCADT will soon make its competitive debut at the U.S. National Drone Association’s Military Drone Crucible Championship, June 30-July 3 in Florida. The team will compete against the 75th Ranger Regiment, among other units, by accomplishing tactical missions that simulate combat.
The Marine Corps is particularly focused on the financial implications of drones. In a statement, the service said the technology offers a range of up to 20 kilometers for less than $5,000, a measure it says is more cost-effective than other expensive weapon systems.
“Right now, we’re focused on rapid skill development by sending Marines to a variety of training courses and increasing practical familiarization,” Tavizon said. “Our goal is to make sure that not only can they operate these systems effectively, but that they can seamlessly integrate them into a team. This means mastering the primary platforms, redundancy with backup systems, and getting the necessary rehearsals to utilize payloads accurately in real-world conditions.”
Ukraine and Russia have used drones in their warfare for years. Most recently, Russia launched 109 drones in a recent attack, according to The Kyiv Independent.
The Houthi rebels in Yemen – a militant group against which the US has recently stepped up its attacks – have also relied on drone warfare to wreak havoc against ships in the Red Sea.
Source: here
A $1 trillion defense budget? Trump and Hegseth say it’s happening
“We’ve also essentially approved a budget, which is in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars,” Trump said during a meeting with Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting to announce the sixth-generation F-47 fighter jet in the Oval Office of the White House, Friday, March 21, 2025 (Demetrius Freeman / The Washington Post via Getty Images) (Demetrius Freeman / The Washington Post via Getty Images)
Speaking Monday night at the White House, President Donald Trump made a surprise announcement: the US appears poised for its first $1 trillion defense budget request.
“We’ve also essentially approved a budget, which is in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars,” Trump said during his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “1 trillion dollars and nobody’s seen that. We have to build our military and we’re very cognizant of the cost, but the military is something we have to build and we have to be strong, because we have a lot of bad forces out there right now.
“So we’re going to pass a budget and I’m proud to say, in fact, the biggest budget we’ve ever done for the military.”
Later, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appeared to confirm that Trump was referring to the request for fiscal year 2026, saying in a message on X: “COMING SOON: first trillion dollar @DeptofDefense budget”.
Exactly when the FY26 budget will drop or what form it will take remains unclear. There has been talk of a “skinny budget” with few details coming first and rumors that May is when the budgets will be officially released, but nothing has been confirmed by the White House or the Pentagon.
In a note to investors, TD Cowen analyst Roman Schweizer wrote that “based on last year’s Greenbook, we assume this means a $50 billion increase for 050 National Defense, which was projected at $951 billion for the FY26 request.”
He noted that while most of these funds will likely go to DoD, some could also be allocated to the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons programs.
“We believe that there have been discussions within the administration and with Congress that pit proponents of more defense spending against those in favor of restricting defense spending,” Schweizer wrote. “It appears – at least for now – that the defense hawks have won.”
Source: here
“Secretary-level and above” officials “working” on F/A-XX fighter jet decision: INTERIM NOC
Meanwhile, Adm. Michael Donnelly told a separate panel that he expects a “core attribute” of the airplane to be its range, up to “probably” 125% “of the range that we currently see today to give us better flexibility [and] better operational coverage.”
SEA AIR SPACE 2025 – The long-awaited final decision on who will build the Navy’s next generation of fighter jets is currently under discussion by top officials, Acting Chief of Naval Operations Adm. James Kilby said today.
“It’s a decision at the secretary level and above, and they’re working on that now,” Kilby told reporters on the first day of the Sea Air Space show outside Washington, DC.
“I don’t want to get ahead of the contract decision, but I will tell you that we need the F/A-XX in the U.S. Navy, as the Air Force says,” he said. “I mean we’re talking about a fight in the Pacific. We fight together as a joint force, so having that capability is very important to us.”
Kilby’s comments come just weeks after President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made a high-profile announcement from the Oval Office that Boeing had won the competition for the Air Force’s Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, now called the F-47.
But despite a Reuters report in late March that an F/A-XX decision is imminent, no similar announcement has been made for the Navy’s next-generation fighter.
The competition for the F/A-XX is believed to be between Boeing and Northrop Grumman, after Lockheed Martin dropped out, as Breaking Defense first reported.
Michael Donnelly, the director of the air warfare division for CNO, said in a separate panel that a “core attribute” of the airplane is expected to be its range, up to “probably” 125% “of the range we currently see today to give us better flexibility [and] operational coverage.”
Like the Air Force’s NGAD, the F/A-XX is expected to fly drones, known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft. Donnelly said the use of artificial intelligence and other technologies in the airplane “will allow us to have a fully integrated architecture with our unmanned systems that we will deploy.”
Source: here
Navy’s hands-in-pockets experiment under review, admiral says
A Defense Department-wide review of grooming and uniform standards will overhaul the year-old rule that allows sailors to put their hands in their pockets while in uniform, said the acting chief of naval operations, Adm. James Kilby, the acting chief of naval operations.
Navy officials will revisit the 2024 decision to allow sailors to put their hands in their pockets while in uniform as part of a DOD-wide review.
Sailors rejoiced last year when the then-chief of naval operations, Adm. Lisa Franchetti, announced they could finally put their hands in their pockets in uniform. But those days may be over.
The acting chief of naval operations, Adm. James W. Kilby, told reporters Monday that a Defense Department review of uniform and grooming standards will include a review of whether sailors should still be allowed to put their hands in their pockets while in uniform.
“We haven’t changed that policy, but I know we’re looking at – because of the Department of Defense – all of our grooming standards are under review now – all of the changes we’ve made since 2015,” Kilby said during the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference. “So for me, everything is on the table. We want a professional force, we want to be ready, and we’re going to follow the direction of the administration.”
The Pentagon-wide review, launched by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last month, directs each service to review changes in physical fitness, body composition and standards of care over the past 10 years. The review is expected to closely scrutinize waivers and exceptions to the standards granted for facial hair, among other topics.
The Navy’s grooming standards fall under the service’s uniform regulations, and that could explain why changes to the uniform policy would also fall under the scope of the standards review, which is being conducted by the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness.
“High standards are what made the U.S. military the greatest fighting force on the planet,” Hegseth wrote in a March 12 memo. “The strength of our military is our unity and our common purpose. We are stronger and more disciplined with high, uncompromising and clear standards.”
The memo was issued about two months after the Air Force announced it would conduct more uniform formations and inspections and review policies and standards that take into account “waivers and exceptions.”
It’s worth noting that Hegseth also wrote in his March 12 memo that the review of grooming standards “includes, but is not limited to, beards.”
Beards have long been a controversial issue for soldiers. US military officials have long argued that facial hair prevents troops from having a perfect seal on gas and oxygen masks. The Marine Corps also recently called for all Marines with medical waivers for shaving to be re-evaluated by a medical professional.
When asked Monday if there was more information available about whether Marines could wear beards, Kilby replied, “I don’t have an update for you.”
Source: here
Crucible: Collapse of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in war or survival through peace?
In the world of politics, wars and conflicts, the margin for error shrinks to a knife’s edge, where a single miscalculation can derail a nation’s course, cement dangerous new realities, offer adversaries a fatal opening, or violently invert the very outcomes it sought to achieve. These are moments without redemption, where every decision carries existential consequences, and second chances dissolve in the crucible of combat.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas[1] carried out its biggest attack on Israel. broke through Gaza’s border fence at dawn, killed 1,189 people-including 815 civilians-injured 7,500, and took 251 hostages. The assault has been compared to America’s 9/11 terrorist attack in its psychological impact and strategic consequences regionally and internationally.
Media outlets aligned with the “Axis of Resistance” swiftly hailed the operation as “shattering the myth of the invincible army,” “exposing the fallacy of Israeli technological and military superiority,” “an intelligence failure,” and “a permanent overturning of the rules of engagement.”
Amid this euphoric rhetoric of “victory,” few observers of the regional landscape and power dynamics foresaw an impending catastrophe in Gaza. Israel, became like a wounded beast, was poised to unleash devastation-not merely seeking revenge, but aiming to dismantle the entire Axis: Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad’s Ba’athist regime in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, and ultimately, Iran’s regime under Khamenei-basically anyone allied with Tehran across the Middle East to confront Israel.
Unifying the arenas V.S. fragmenting the arenas – SOURCE RUSSIA
On the second day of Israel’s war against the Gaza Strip, Lebanon’s Hezbollah announced the opening of what it described as a “support”-not confrontational-agreement to support Hamas. In the end, this front has neither significantly supported Gaza nor reduced the burden of Israeli attacks. Instead, it neutralized Hezbollah as a decisive force in the fighting.
From the very first hours of the attack, supporters of the Iranian axis realized that its position was not what they had expected. Iran continued to insist that it had no warning about Hamas’ October 7 invasion of Israel. Three sourcesclaimed that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, told Ismail Haniyeh that “Iran will continue to give the group its political and moral support, but will not intervene directly.”Sending a message to the Hamas chief that he had not warned Iran about the October 7 attack on Israel so that it would not go to war on their behalf. This stance appeared to some as a tactic, while others perceived it as an evasion – it left Hamas exposed.
As the Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip became increasingly intense, Tehran stepped up its rhetoric against Israel, declaring that it “will not stand idly by” in the face of what it called “Israeli crimes”. Just ten days after the Israeli onslaught began, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a “final warning”. Then, after the October 19 massacre at Al-Mamadani hospital, former Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian tweeted, ” Time is up!” On the ground, however, nothing has changed – except that the situation has worsened, plunging Gaza, the West Bank, Yemen and the Lebanese front into deeper catastrophe.
On April 1, 2024, Israel struck Iran’s consulate in the heart of Damascus, targeting Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior IRGC Quds Force commander who oversees operations in Syria and Lebanon. The attack appeared to be a deliberate provocation, as if Israel was trying to provoke Iran into a direct conflict, something Iran apparently did not want. However, on April 13, 2024, Iran launched its first direct attack on Israel from its own territory. Called “Operation True Promise I”, the assault involved over 300 missiles and drones, but failed to alter the course of the conflict or change the balance of power in the war. Israel not only intercepted the vast majority of these strikes, it responded decisively on April 19 with a retaliatory drone strike targeting the Isfahan air base – a clear demonstration of its direct challenge to Iran’s deterrence capabilities.
On July 24, 2013, Israel escalated tensions by assassinating Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, in a rocket attack on his residence in Tehran. The attack posed a serious challenge to Iran – not only did it challenge its regional role, it exposed its inability to protect a key ally. The assassination placed Iran in an unsustainable position. As the main patron of Hamas, Tehran has faced mounting pressure to retaliate, with the world watching to see how it will respond to this brazen violation of its sovereignty.
The Iranian axis was barely catching its breath when on September 17, 2024, synchronized pager and walkie-talkie attacks struck, killing at least 39 people and injuring an estimated 4,000. This was not just an attack, but a decapitation: the operation left Hezbollah “functionally dead, paralyzed and blind.” The attack was described by the Israeli head of Mossad, David Barnea, as a “turning point ” in the fighting in Lebanon. “This operation marked a turning point in the north, during which we turned the tide against our enemies,” “A direct line can be drawn from the pager operation to the elimination of (Hassan) Nasrallah and the ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah suffered a devastating blow that shattered the spirit of the organization.”
Significantly, there has been on the Syrian front a “fracture” in Assad’s post-October 7 posture, marked by a cautious departure from his traditional anti-Israel rhetoric. The regime’s uncharacteristic silence – no condemnations of Israeli operations, no declarations of Palestinian solidarity, just calculated ambiguity – suggested an attempt to insulate Syria from the escalating “Axis of Resistance” conflict and Bashar al-Assad’s attempts to escape Israel’s vengeance. While Iran became suspicious of a possible Assad defection, it interpreted this stance as a reluctance to engage, prompting Tehran to step up pressure on Assad for a more confrontational stance.
Iran’s willingness to promote the “Unity of the Fronts” doctrine served a dual purpose: coordinating pressure against Israel while preventing allied governments – especially Syria – from pursuing independent de-escalation. The doctrine essentially acted as an insurance policy against defection, ensuring that all members of Iran’s axis remained locked in confrontation whether they wanted to or not.
In a dramatic escalation just ten days later, on September 27, 2024, Israel carried out a precision strike taking out three high-value targets simultaneously: the secretary general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. Ali Karaki – commander of its southern front operations, and Abbas Nilforoushan – general of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force that oversees Lebanon’s portfolio. The operation marked a significant blow to Hezbollah’s military command structure, Iran’s regional proxy network and the coordination of the “unification of fronts” between Tehran and its allies.
The assassination of Hassan Nasrallah – the charismatic leader – created a seismic shift in the trajectory of the conflict. The assassination has thrown Hezbollah into paralysis, caught between the immediate need to absorb this devastating blow to its leadership and the overwhelming pressure to pursue retaliatory action. This was no ordinary targeted strike. By eliminating Nasrallah – Tehran’s most effective proxy commander and a unifying figure in the Axis of Resistance – Israel crossed a threshold that many interpreted as a direct declaration of war. US intelligence officials have publicly warned of imminent Iranian retaliation, recognizing that Tehran cannot let such a provocation go unanswered. The aftermath has seen the entire region hovering on the brink as the assassination has redrawn the boundaries of escalation and forced each actor to reconsider its strategic calculus. Nasrallah’s death not only created a power vacuum, but threatened to reveal the fragile deterrence that has prevented all-out war in the region for years, but has opened up fronts of attrition against Israel.
In October 2024, Iran launched “True Promise 2 ” – a direct rocket attack from its territory targeting Israel’s Mossad headquarters, three air bases, radar systems and armored units. The Revolutionary Guards boasted a 90% success rate, but the operation fell far short of the expectations of Resistance supporters, particularly in Lebanon, who saw it as a half-hearted response to escalating Israeli assassinations.
The subsequent assassination of Hezbollah’s leadership threw the party into disarray – a volatile mix of grief, anger and paralysis. Each defeat compounded the weight of their situation: the desire for revenge collided with the crushing reality of their strategic dilemma. The blows came too fast to process, the burden too heavy to bear.
On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire silenced the fire on the Lebanese front – but the war simply moved to a new front, where the flames of war erupted against the weakest link in the axis – the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. What happened next defied all expectations. Starting in Aleppo, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham factions launched a devastating offensive that saw the strategic provinces of Aleppo, Hama and Homs collapse in rapid succession like dominoes. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which had previously intervened to save Assad from oblivion during the 2011 Syrian war, now lay dormant. Abandoned by his allies, Assad’s desperate pleas for help met only silence from a distraught Hezbollah – itself shocked by its losses and perhaps feeling betrayed. Even Iraq refused to send reinforcements. In just ten days, by December 8, 2024, Assad’s regime completely collapsed. A new regime with a totally different identity and a different foreign policy strategy now rules Syria.
The fall of Assad has not only changed the fate of Syria and the region; it has revealed the fatal weaknesses of the Iranian Axis, the high levels of suspicion and mistrust or the pre-emptive attempts of some to jump off a sinking ship. This development has had significant implications for Iran’s regional strategy, with questions raised about its deterrence capabilities. while Iran’s proxy networks have shown signs of reduced effectiveness.
To compound these changes, the international landscape has decisively turned against Iran with Trump’s return to power in January 2025 and the reintroduction of “Maximum Pressure” tactics.
Given Prime Minister Netanyahu’s demonstrated willingness to pursue military action against Iran, the risk of a direct confrontation looks increasingly likely. Current tensions suggest that escalation may be inevitable in the short term.
Countering Iran’s ‘unifying arenas’ strategy, the US and Israel have implemented a deliberate ‘fragmentation of arenas’ approach, systematically targeting Tehran’s proxy networks – from Lebanon and Syria to the ongoing attacks against Houthi forces in Yemen, with a potential extension into Iraq. This coordinated campaign aims to dismantle Iran’s architecture of regional influence by cutting off proxy control, neutralizing cross-border deterrence capabilities, and eroding its strategic influence – effectively silencing conflict fronts while isolating Tehran through sanctions pressure. The ultimate objective remains forcing diplomatic concessions while maintaining military escalation as a final contingency, as Trump’s posturing has demonstrated.
Iran currently faces a critical strategic dilemma where both compliance and confrontation pose existential risks. On the one hand, accepting US demands to abandon its nuclear program could replicate the vulnerabilities experienced by post-2003 Libya and post-2014 Syria, where disarmament preceded regime destabilization. On the other hand, refusal to comply plays a role in Israel’s preferred escalation scenario, exacerbated by the Trump administration’s purely coercive approach, which offers no diplomatic incentives. This zero-sum calculus has empowered Iran’s hardline faction – led by Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards – to see confrontation as the only viable option, while moderate voices advocating alternative solutions remain marginalized in the current political framework. Despite the high costs involved, the trajectory appears to be decidedly confrontation-oriented. Located atapproximately 3,700 kilometers south of Iran and historically significant launch site for major US offensive operations-including the Vietnam War, both Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003), and the invasion of Afghanistan- strongly suggests that these newly deployed capabilities are intended for offensive, rather than defensive, purposes in the Middle East.
Regionally, Iran’s foreign policy – characterized by a dual approach of military engagement and diplomatic maneuvering through the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – has alienated neighboring states, causing the Gulf states, post-Assad Syria, post-Hezbollah Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey to reassess their alliances in ways that increasingly work against Iran’s interests. This “battlefield vs. diplomacy” approach has left Tehran with limited regional support, effectively forcing it to operate independently in geopolitical conflicts. From the US-Israel perspective, they prefer to install a more compliant regime.
Amid this gloom, bleak outlook, and overwhelming appetite to wage a destructive war against Iran to topple its regime, Iran may still be able to use diplomacy and skillfully exploit conflicting interests in the region. What if Iran abandons its traditional role in the region? What if it proposes a “maximum peace” initiative in exchange for Trump’s “maximum pressure” What if Khamenei rebels against his own legacy before domestic forces can do so – and proposes not just negotiations but peace with Israel itself? Would this not shift the balance – internally, regionally and globally?
At a time when the whole world expects the Iranian regime to remain stubborn (as Bashar al-Assad did) to negotiate under pressure, and when everyone assumes that Iran will never give up its regional role or abandon its missile program or nuclear ambitions – what if Iran rises above all this and initiates peace with Israel?
Wouldn’t that leave Netanyahu, who constantly says that Iran threatens Israel’s national security, in a position of no support? Would it not embarrass Donald Trump, who professes his desire for peace, and test his true desire to pursue it? Would it not derail the plans of the Iranian opposition, already ready to seize power in the event of war against the current regime – an opposition that is itself prepared to make peace with Israel?
Not only that, it would gain popularity and internal respect for the regime. The Iranian people would see their leadership enduring all hardships to protect them, stop the bloodshed and protect Iran from unwanted aggression, to stop the violence and keep Iran secure.
Would such an announcement not send shock waves around the world? Would it not upend the power dynamic in the region – before that dynamic turns decisively against Iran?
Such a proposal sounds very bold, given the Iranian regime’s long history of hostility toward Israel and the United States. But in politics, at difficult and critical moments, unconventional and extraordinary measures are sometimes necessary – measures that rewrite history and reshape the future of nations. A single act of courage could not only save Iran, but the entire Middle East, lifting a heavy burden from the region and ushering Iran and the region into a new era of transformation.
They say that in politics there are no eternal allies, no perpetual enemies – only enduring interests. If survival is Iran’s greatest interest, then let peace become its supreme act of defiance. Let it be the new “resistance.”
Source: here
US Navy accepts anti-mine USVs from Bollinger
Bollinger Shipyards has handed over to the US Navy its first unmanned surface vehicles (MCM USVs) as part of a 2022 contract .
The package includes the first three platforms under the initiative, which were built at the company’s Lockport, Louisiana factory.
The effort covers the production of nine drone boats, with an option for up to 18 additional systems, depending on force requirements.
Once activated, these craft will be used for autonomous mine hunting, mine clearance and mine neutralization.
Such missions have traditionally been assigned to MCM-1 or Avenger-class ships, operational since the 1980s. The fleet is usually coupled with the MH-53E Sea Dragon MH-53E anti-mine helicopters introduced in the same period.
MCM ship USS Avenger.
Critical assets
The U.S. Navy’s new USV MCM MCMs will reduce the risks of sea mine tasks for personnel by conducting operations without boarding an actual crew.
Another benefit of these platforms comes from their built-in multiple payload delivery systems to carry present and future anti-mine capabilities in theater.
“Bollinger is proud to deliver the first three full-production MCM USVs to the U.S. Navy,” said Bollinger Shipyards CEO and President, Ben Bordelon.
“This milestone demonstrates Bollinger’s ability to deliver highly complex, state-of-the-art capabilities that meet the evolving needs of our naval forces. We are honored to play a critical role in supporting the Navy’s future force and are proud of our skilled workforce that makes this possible.”
Modernizing naval MCM systems
Bollinger’s delivery to the U.S. Navy follows a contract it signed last February to provide tested materials for autonomous MCM operations.
The deal was awarded as part of a larger acquisition of mission packages to bolster the service’s anti-mine capabilities, particularly its fleets of littoral combat ships, while securing “key maritime regions and preserving global shipping lanes.”
Source: here
Anduril introduces Copperhead: an underwater kamikaze drone inspired by torpedoes
Anduril has unveiled a torpedo-inspired underwater attack drone said to reshape submarine warfare with fast and cost-effective responses to emerging threats.
Dubbed Copperhead, the software-defined weapon enables naval forces to more effectively engage maritime threats, enhancing the protection of valuable assets and personnel.
It comes in two models – the Copperhead-100 and Copperhead-500 – offering different sizes, ranges and payload capabilities to suit various operational needs.
It can also reach speeds in excess of 30 knots (55 kilometers / 34 miles per hour) and can be equipped with active and passive sensors, magnetometers and side-scan sonar.
According to Anduril, the kamikaze drone ushers in a new era of autonomous underwater domination, offering a “mass producible” solution at a fraction of the cost of older systems.
Compatible with large underwater vehicles
Copperhead is described as the first torpedo-like capability designed to be carried by autonomous underwater systems.
It can be launched from Anduril’s Dive-LD and Dive-XL platforms, offering the ability to control vast ocean areas with an unprecedented level of autonomous maritime power.
“Current systems are expensive, slow to produce and tightly coupled to legacy platforms such as nuclear submarines and warships,” the company said.
“The US and its allies need much more autonomous submarine systems that can be deployed quickly, which can integrate with the expanding fleet of autonomous undersea, surface and air vehicles.”
Beyond precision strikes, Copperhead can support critical missions such as search and rescue, infrastructure inspection and environmental monitoring.
Anduril plans to integrate Copperhead into larger unmanned underwater platforms, including its Ghost Shark autonomous submarine, to further expand its capabilities.
Source: here
The rules-based global trading system is largely irrelevant
Absent major policy changes from the US and other major powers, the rules-based global trading system will continue to slide into irrelevance, replacing rules with power as the biggest determinant of trade relations.
Amid the chaos of US President Donald Trump’s trade actions in his first two months in office, one key development has been overlooked. Two of the countries most vulnerable to US tariffs – China and Canada – surprisingly requested consultations with the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in early February and early March 2025. These requests represent the first step in WTO dispute settlement. The US accepted both requests on March 14. However, applause for the enduring integrity of the global trading system should be withheld. WTO rules are no longer applicable and will no longer apply from 2019. All parties involved know this, which makes their demands and acceptance indicative of the institution’s long slide into irrelevance – the equivalent of institutional death.
A mixture of American hostility and indifference
Since December 2019, when the first Trump administration blocked new appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body, leaving it unable to review appeals due to lack of members, the WTO has been moribund, albeit with occasional glimmers of life. There have been, for example, various proposals from European members and others to reform the general dispute settlement system – the organization’s “crown jewel.” The WTO General Council was tasked with building a consensus for reform. However, by the end of 2024, progress towards resolving the various disagreements between members had stalled. The chair of the 2024 reform process and Norway’s ambassador to the WTO, Petter Ølberg, concluded in his December report that “the majority of Members have indicated that their interests are best served by key features of the current system, without fundamental changes to them”.
There was some hope that the administration of former US President Joe Biden would unblock appointments and involve the US more in the reform process, but this never materialized. Barring an almost unthinkable change, US indifference – if not outright hostility – will continue for at least the next four years. By then, it may be too late to reinvigorate the organization. Without an appellate body, the dispute settlement process becomes illegitimate. And without a legitimate dispute settlement process, many countries will act as if the rules no longer apply, as the US is now doing. Others will surely follow – no doubt some already have.
Loss of good faith
Moreover, even if, in a sudden burst of global comity, agreement is reached on reforming the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, the outstanding issue of the national security exemption remains. The exemption is found in Article 21, “Security Exceptions,” of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 and 1994, and provides that the agreement “shall not be construed […] to prevent any contracting party from taking any action it considers necessary to protect its essential security interests.” Until recent years it was invoked so rarely that its use by Sweden in 1975 to justify import quotas on shoes was something of a joke in trade circles.
For proponents of the rules-based trading system, the exemption is not so funny anymore. The US has cited it 30 times since 2017. In 2024 alone, it has been cited by different countries in at least 95 separate notifications to the WTO. Its original intent, to cover fissile material, arms, munitions and instruments of war, has been so degraded that countries have felt comfortable enough to erect barriers to the import of agricultural commodities and household furnishings on national security grounds.
However, these measures cannot really be challenged – however absurd the individual assertion may be – especially now that the US invokes them so often. This has long been the concern about Article 21: there needed to be general agreement, but there also needed to be good faith – especially from the strongest member countries – to make the system work. In other words: if national security exemption is allowed to apply to any product or group of products, then the rules become increasingly meaningless.
That good faith seems to have disappeared. Along with it, and along with the state of the dispute settlement mechanism, so is the post-World War II rules-based trading system, at least globally. Numerous overlapping bilateral and mega-regional trade agreements – such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – still have WTO law as their starting point, but enforcement can be a problem. Most of these pacts lack a permanent secretariat to manage the vital tasks of implementation and monitoring compliance with the principles of the agreement.
A looming vacuum in global trade
Instead of rules, power will become an increasingly important determinant of trade relations. The same can be said for “geopolitical distance”, a measure of the extent to which allies trade with each other or within allied blocs. The latter is less static than appreciated. In 1848, the UK Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, said of his country: ‘We have no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and it is our duty to pursue those interests”. He could have been talking about most major countries in 2025.
In the recent past, others have likened the WTO and the rules-based global trading system to oxygen – you take it for granted until it’s gone. The inequities and imbalances remain because of the myriad violations and failures of the rules-based global trading system, to be sure. But the vacuum into which global trade is about to enter could sooner than they think, economies around the world could run out of breath.
Source: here
Desert Storm: China’s Gobi missile salvo, a message to the US – April 8, 2025
Signs of unprecedented missile testing will dominate future battles shaped by mass strikes and space threats
China has just launched a warning shot from the Gobi desert – combining the firepower of massed ballistic missile firepower, precision radar tracking and a clear message of strategic intent.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently conducted an unprecedented missile defense test in the Gobi Desert, showing its advanced capabilities and strategic resolve amid heightened global tensions.
The exercise involved the simultaneous launch of 16 ballistic missiles at a single target, testing a new dual-band phased-array dual-band (S/X) radar phased-array system designed to counter saturation attacks, according to a PLA Unit 63623 study cited in the SCMP report.
This radar system, which has achieved 100% detection and tracking success, has demonstrated its ability to differentiate between warheads and decoys while maintaining accurate threat prioritization.
The technology mirrors, but rivals, the US Navy’s USNS Howard O Lorenzen system, although China’s test marked the first live-fire demonstration of its kind.
Analysts note that the achievement marks a significant leap in China’s ability to counter sophisticated threats such as hypersonic vehicles and missiles equipped with countermeasures. The large-scale test, unprecedented outside of war scenarios, underlines China’s commitment to strengthening military readiness.
Ballistic missiles are among the most expensive weapon systems, so the PLA’s willingness to undertake such a costly endeavor reflects a strategic focus on deterrence, particularly in potential conflicts in Taiwan and the South China Sea.
China’s autonomous missile production further complements this shift, signaling its intent to sustain and expand its arsenal.
Examining the determinants of China’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability, Jacob Mezey notes in a September 2024 article for the Atlantic Council that China’s BMD program was originally rooted in Cold War-era fears of US preemption.
Its development now serves several purposes, namely: protecting the leadership and nuclear forces from limited strikes, countering India’s expanding missile arsenal, and supporting a potential launch warning posture.
Mezey notes that BMD research also complements China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, offering dual-use technological benefits.
Underscoring the vulnerability of China’s land-based nuclear arsenal, Ryan Snyder notes in a December 2024 article in Science & Global Security magazine that US nuclear ballistic nuclear missiles pose a serious threat to China’s land-based nuclear arsenal due to their accuracy and high yield.
Snyder estimates that Chinese missile silos, likely hardened to as much as 1,500 psi, are vulnerable to ground motion induced by a U.S. nuclear explosion.
Using standard models for peak overpressure and lethal radius, he estimates that single-hit kill probabilities against such silos exceed 90%.
He notes that, given the similar size of China’s silos to Russian designs and no evidence of advanced shock isolation systems, their survivability against modern US nuclear counterforce capabilities remains seriously in question.
Moreover, Hans Kristensen and other writers note in a September 2024 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that India has significantly expanded its land-based nuclear-capable missile force, with systems capable of striking deep into Chinese territory.
Kristensen and others note that the Agni-II and Agni-III, with ranges exceeding 2,000 and 3,200 kilometers, are believed to be targeting western, central and southern regions of China.
In addition, they claim that Agni-IV, deployed from 2022, can reach more than 3,500 kilometers, while Agni-V, expected to be operational by 2025, extends its strike capability beyond 5,000 kilometers.
In addition, they note that the upcoming Agni-VI, with a projected range of more than 6,000 kilometers, will further expand coverage.
As for China’s new BMD radar to support ASAT capabilities, Decker Eveleth notes in a September 2024 China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) report that China operates several Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) stations that provide dual-purpose capabilities: early warning of missiles and tracking of high-altitude space objects.
Eveleth says these LPARs can detect ballistic missiles and satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) beyond visual range, making them essential assets for strategic defense and space situational awareness (SSA).
Such capabilities may be vital for targeting US satellite constellations such as Starlink, which has proven its military value in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
Howard Wang and other writers note in a March 2024 RAND report that the PLA views Starlink and similar satellite constellations as significant threats that fundamentally challenge its core operational concepts.
Wang and others say that the PLA believes Starlink undermines its strategy of disabling adversary systems by neutralizing key nodes due to Starlink’s resilience, decentralization, and rapid reconstitution capabilities.
They note that Starlink offers unprecedented real-time battlefield awareness, enhanced precision targeting, and nuclear strike support.
Some assessments also claim that Starlink could intercept hypersonic missiles or function as kinetic vehicles, underscoring how the PLA perceives such constellations as destabilizing and integral to the future US space war.
While the launch of many ballistic missiles is a powerful show of force, it also highlights China’s industrial capacity to produce these weapons on a large scale.
Underscoring the importance of ballistic missiles to China’s military strategy, the US Department of Defense’s China’s Military Power 2024 report notes that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) serves as the cornerstone of China’s nuclear and conventional missile strategy, organizing, training and equipping its growing land attack capabilities.
According to the report, the PLARF is tasked with strategic deterrence and regional counterinsurgency, operating more than 40 brigades at seven missile bases and three support bases.
The PLARF also has a mix of nuclear and conventional missiles, including the DF-15, DF-16, DF-17, DF-26 and DF-41, as well as cruise missiles.
The report says PLARF’s dual command structure supports both theater and central operations. It notes that the ongoing modernization includes expanded intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and the integration of multiple re-entry independently targetable targeting vehicles (MIRVs) to enhance survivability and the retaliatory force.
Supporting PLARF’s firepower, Peter Wood and Alex Stone note in a May 2021 CASI report that China’s ballistic missile industry has expanded significantly in recent years, driven by increased investment, infrastructure growth, and military-civilian fusion initiatives.
Wood and Stone note that major facilities such as China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s (CASC) Factory 211 and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s (CASIC) Fourth Design Department have established new production zones, high-performance computing centers, and joint industrial parks in collaboration with civilian firms.
They note that the sector benefits from vertically integrated R&D institutions and a growing workforce.
However, they also note that China’s ballistic missile industry faces persistent challenges, including talent retention issues, delayed adoption of advanced manufacturing techniques, and reliance on incremental modernization rather than frontier innovation.
These gaps, they say, reveal gaps between China’s domestic breakthroughs and global best practices in missile development and production.
What was revealed in the Gobi was more than a missile test – it was a rehearsal calibrated to deter missiles in a world where space, speed and mass firepower define the battlespace.
Source: here
When troops return home to Russia and Ukraine – April 8, 2025
Russian and Ukrainian soldiers will eventually lay down their arms, but returning from the frontlines will cause its own problems.
Serving two years in prison for a 2020 murder, Ivan Rossomakhin was conscripted into a Russian private military company (PMC) in exchange for his freedom. He returned home from Ukraine in 2023 and within days had murdered an 85-year-old woman in a nearby town. A week after he began his new sentence in August 2024, he was re-recruited and sent back to the front.
His murder marks one of many committed by prisoners pardoned to serve in the military and Russian troops returning home. “A survey of Russian court records conducted by the independent media outlet Verstka found that at least 190 criminal cases had been initiated against Wagner’s pardoned recruits in 2023,” a New York Times article in April 2024 said.
Growing concerns point to a potentially worse repeat of the “Afghan syndrome” experienced by Soviet veterans of the 1979-1989 Afghan war. Many of the estimated 642,000 Soviet soldiers who served returned as outcasts in a society eager to forget an unpopular war.
Many turned to addiction and alcoholism, along with organized crime, further amplified by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In addition, Chechen veterans of the Afghan war used their combat experience to fiercely resist Russia in the first Chechen war (1994-1996).
The war in Ukraine is producing an even larger and more battle-hardened generation of veterans. Russian casualties topped 15,000 in nearly five months of war, surpassing a decade of Soviet losses in Afghanistan.
A January 2025 New York Times article estimates that about 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed by December 2024, while 150,000 Russian soldiers had lost their lives by November of that year.
In the meantime, hundreds of thousands were wounded and millions were transported to the frontline. Most of the survivors will have some form of PTSD, further desensitized by the glorification of videos of brutal combat and torture on social media.
Ukrainian soldiers “were experiencing intense symptoms of psychological distress,” according to a Washington Post article in 2023. Meanwhile, in 2024, Deutsche Welle reported that “According to the Russian Ministry of Health, 11,000 Russian servicemen who took part in the war against Ukraine, as well as their family members, sought psychological help in a six-month period in 2023.”
Reintegrating these men back into society will be an uphill battle for the Russian and Ukrainian governments, with a lingering caution over past failures. In December 2022, Russian Federation Council President Valentina Matviyenko vowed to prevent a repeat of the Afghan syndrome and reintegrate veterans back into civilian life.
However, as the war continues, its consequences are already unfolding. Both Moscow and Kiev are managing ongoing troop rotations as they prepare for the eventual mass return of soldiers and explore how to use them for political and military purposes.
Crime and unrest
For Afghan Soviet veterans, disparaging rhetoric about the war and limited support for their return have created deep resentment.
Before coming to power in 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called the war a mistake, and it took until 1994 for Russian Afghan veterans to receive the same status as World War II veterans. It was only in 2010 that Russia designated the end of the conflict as a state holiday.
The Kremlin has taken a different approach to Ukraine’s war veterans, venerating them as thenation’s “new elite” in a life-or-death struggle against the West. In addition to widespread praise in the media, the soldiers were quickly dispatched to important roles in government and business. Despite strained social services, the government offered benefits to the families of returning and fallen servicemen to prevent unrest.
The Kremlin’s decision to use prison labor to cover troop numbers – an approach it avoided during the war in Afghanistan – has already caused serious consequences. By 2023, more than 100,000 prisoners had been recruited, many joining Wagner, Russia’s best-known private military company.
Although Wagner was subsequently absorbed and reorganized after the armed rebellion against the Russian military later that year, its former detained soldiers remain a source of public outrage, committing some of the most serious violent crimes upon their return and contributing to a general rise in crime.
“There have been numerous shootings in Moscow, and the military is increasingly merging with organized crime,” a 2024 report in the Eurasia Daily Monitor said.
While the issue is attracting increasing public attention, Russia’s internal security services, including the National Guard (Rosgvardiya), are already overstretched, tasked with patrolling occupied Ukrainian territories while reinforcing frontline units.
Their burden could become heavier if returning Chechen soldiers, whom Moscow has deployed extensively in Ukraine, choose to revise their independence ambitions. Other nationalist and extremist movements, aided by hardened soldiers, risk resurfacing.
Russia’s reliance on criminal networks for logistical and financial support in its war has only encouraged these groups. A 2024 shooting just blocks from the Kremlin in 2024 linked to “corporate violence” evoked the chaos of the 1990s.
“Russia’s economy, strained by sanctions and the ongoing war, is creating an atmosphere in which business elites are increasingly willing to resort to drastic measures to survive. In the 1990s, oligarchs, criminal gangs and corrupt officials thrived in an environment where the legal system was powerless,” the Moscow Times said.
With few prospects for well-paid work, returning soldiers may be tempted to join existing groups or create their own, destabilizing Russia’s criminal networks, which are deeply embedded in Putin’s power structure.
Ukraine faces similar challenges. Although Kiev has been slower and more restrained in deploying prisoner battalions, reintegrating them into society will not be easy. Authorities in the country are working to prevent powerful domestic criminal organizations from absorbing the returning soldiers while facing the threat of armed resistance in Russian-leaning regions.
The Ukrainian government has honored its soldiers but has seen an increase in attacks on recruitment offices, including four attacks in five days in February 2025. While Russian recruitment efforts have also faced some backlash, Russia has avoided large-scale conscription (despite some constraints).
In contrast, Ukraine has relied heavily on compulsory enlistment, leading to growing antagonism towards conscription measures – tensions that will continue to rise and could spread after the war.
Private military companies
The war is already providing a massive impetus to a booming global private military industry, which is likely to expand after the conflict is over.
Private military company recruits have long participated in a multinational market – some Russian Afghan veterans claim to have been contracted to serve with US forces in Afghanistan after 2001.
However, the sheer number of Russian and Ukrainian veterans with combat experience could revolutionize the industry, much as did the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting military surplus.
Before 2015, Russian PMCs were confined to Ukraine, Senegal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but since then they have expanded to about 30 countries. Unlike in the large-scale, technology-driven Ukrainian conflict, smaller PMCs can operate effectively in other regions, and their deployment has already contributed to the French military’s withdrawal from Africa in recent years.
Ukraine’s private military sector is similarly growing and in the future could find favor with European countries that supported Kiev during the war. Given Europe’s continuing struggle to meet its military recruitment needs, it is likely that Ukrainian veterans will be used to solve this problem.
In Ukraine and Russia, demobilized men have often been hired by oligarchs for their own purposes, a trend that emerged in the 1990s. This problem resurfaced in 2015, when Ukrainian billionaire Igor Kolomoisky used PMCs to fight Russian-backed separatists as well as to protect his own financial interests, culminating in an armed confrontation at a state oil company.
The incident showed how privatized military power can easily escape government control – something Russia later experienced with the Wagner rebellion in 2023.
Reintegration
After the instability caused by Afghan Soviet veterans throughout the 1990s, the Russian authorities began to take more concrete steps to integrate them, rehabilitate their image and harness their potential.
In 1999, the Russian Alliance of Afghanistan Veterans helped create what would become the Putin-backed United Russia party (though now independent). Afghan and Chechen war veterans have also joined OMON, Russia’s special police force used to suppress protests, while other paramilitary veterans groups helped Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, when the military force was limited.
More recently, Afghan veterans organizations have been instrumental in supporting the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine by providing volunteers (with Ukraine rallying Afghan veterans) and garnering support.
The evolution of the movement from disillusioned anti-war veterans to some of the strongest supporters of the Ukrainian war shows the effectiveness of its renewal and the Kremlin’s recognition of their value.
Bottom of the form
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Kremlin has actively prevented the formation of independent organizations of veterans of the current war in Ukraine. This move to centralize veterans into formal initiatives ensures that no group can challenge government authority and can be organized and used during future conflicts.
The attitude of returning servicemen on both sides will also be shaped by the outcome of the war. Conflicts deemed unnecessary, with waning public approval – such as the US conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Soviet war in Afghanistan – leave a lasting psychological impact on veterans, increasing the potential for suicide and social unrest.
Beyond the stag stag staggering civilian and combatant losses, these wars generated resentment among returning soldiers, many of whom struggled with the sense that their service had been part of failed wars of aggression.
The framing of victory by political leaders, the media and society is therefore crucial. Soldiers who believe they have fought a just and successful war are more likely to reintegrate with a sense of purpose, compared to a defeated side that feels abandoned and bitter.
The defeated are likely to have greater animosity toward its government, have grievances about inadequate support, and face an increased risk of social instability – making both sides more likely to claim victory.
It may be in Moscow and Kiev’s interest to avoid declaring an end to the war and pursue demobilization, lest they be seen as conceding defeat and triggering the return of restless and unemployed soldiers. With the Russian and Ukrainian economies now heavily geared toward war, a quick end would trigger economic shocks.
An inconclusive war that ends gradually, however, may allow veterans to slowly reintegrate into society as governments praise their service to generate goodwill. Others will be encouraged by Moscow and Kiev to look for ways out in other conflicts, exporting combat-ready men instead of bringing them home.
John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist based in Washington, D.C. and global affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He contributes to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, “Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West with an Economy Smaller Than Texas,” was published in December 2022.
Source: here
Greece pledges $27 billion for defense overhaul centered on high-tech warfare
Greece will spend 25 billion euros ($27 billion) over the next decade to adapt its military to high-tech warfare technologies, officials announced Wednesday.
Defense Minister Nikos Dendias told parliament that the overhaul will be built around a planned air defense system dubbed “Achilles’ Shield”, aimed primarily at resolving tensions with neighboring Turkey.
The two NATO members have long-standing disputes over borders in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean that have brought them close to war several times in recent decades.
Dendias said Greece plans to shift from traditional defense systems to a high-tech strategy centered on mobile, artificial intelligence-based missile systems, drone technologies and advanced command units – reducing reliance on conventional fleets.
The plan also includes new programs such as equipping next-generation soldiers equipped with sensors and communications systems and developing dedicated satellite capabilities to ensure secure communications during conflict.
“What we’re proposing is an existential issue for the country – a complete change in our approach to defense, a total change in doctrine,” Dendias said. “We are moving away from the traditional thinking that the Aegean is only defended by the fleet.”
The overhaul, which will be presented to lawmakers behind closed doors in the coming weeks, also involves greater inclusion of local tech start-ups and a major reorganization of personnel – merging units, closing underutilized bases and tackling a top command structure.
The initiative comes as European countries step up their military spending in response to the ongoing war in Ukraine and hints that the Trump administration wants to reduce the US commitment to European defense.
Greece’s modernization effort – launched after years of defense cuts during the 2010-2018 financial crisis – already includes all branches of the armed forces and focuses on cooperation with France, Israel and the United States. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior Israeli defense officials in Israel on Sunday. On Wednesday, Mitsotakis rejected calls by some opposition parties to scrap plans to buy US-made F-35 fighter jets in favor of a European alternative, describing the program as an important “long-term investment.”
Source: here
France calls for new EU munitions plan, accelerating satellite constellation
France is calling for a new European plan to boost munitions production, including complex munitions such as missiles, and wants to advance it at a meeting of European Union defense ministers in Warsaw this week, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu said.
Lecornu will also ask the European Commission to speed up the deployment and increase the budget for the IRIS² sovereign satellite constellation, the French minister said in a press briefing with his Danish counterpart Troels Lund Poulsen in Paris on Tuesday afternoon.
Defense ministers are meeting on April 2-3 to discuss a white paper on the future of European defense, the development and financing of defense capabilities within the 27-nation bloc and military support for Ukraine. Lecornu said policymakers must move to concrete measures to build Europe’s defense industry.
“We need to stop with the big speeches, we need to stop with the billion-dollar packages where we don’t always know exactly how they work,” Lecornu said. “We need things that are sometimes maybe more modest but very effective.”
The EU law to support ammunition production “has worked, so we are asking for a new edition of an ASAP-type facility,” according to Lecornu. The European Commission has earmarked €500 million ($540 million) through the program to increase ammunition production, and now forecasts the bloc will produce 2 million artillery shells this year, up from an estimated annual capacity of 230,000 rounds in early 2023.
A new munitions program should cover both simple and complicated munitions, including missiles, the French minister said. EU aid could help in a hypothetical scenario in which missile maker MBDA would set up licensed production in European countries by adding to corporate financing and purchases by the host country, according to Lecornu.
France has backing from other EU members to ask the Commission to accelerate the IRIS² plan for a sovereign constellation of European satellites, Lecornu said, declining to name countries. The project is essential for European strategic autonomy and is progressing, but has “a huge challenge in terms of lead time”, the minister said.
The consortium chosen to deploy the satellite constellation, led by SES, Eutelsat and Hispasat, is aiming for full operational status by the early 2030s, pushing IRIS² back a few years compared to an EU timetable from March 2023 that envisaged full service in 2027.
“It is an issue that the commission is obviously looking forward to and that we would like to help,” Lecornu said. “It’s about money because it’s about acceleration, and money means acceleration. It can also be about streamlining the organization, the very governance of IRIS².”
“It makes sense, because we don’t have a solution, we don’t have a plan B, either this or Starlink,” Lecornu said, referring to the satellite constellation operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX.
“The problem is that we have industrial time that is sometimes correlated with diplomatic time,” Lecornu said. “I’m trying to reduce diplomatic time, because there are still people making noise and doing complicated things, when in fact there are industrial opportunities.”
Denmark has formalized the purchase of French Mistral short-range air defense missiles in Paris and “we can do even more together,” Lund Poulsen said. “I also hope that it will be possible to make further announcements in the next month about new acquisitions in France. I think French defense companies have a lot to offer.”
In February, the Danish government agreed to allocate an additional 50 billion kroner ($7.2 billion) for defense over the next two years, boosting defense spending to more than 3% of GDP in 2025 and 2026.
The Nordic nation is looking to rebuild an air defense bubble after decommissioning its Hawk missile systems in 2005. Denmark last month selected Franco-Italian SAMP/T and US Patriot SAMP/T air defense batteries to cover the upper end of the threat spectrum in its planned procurement, while MBDA France’s VL MICA system from MBDA, Kongsberg’s NASAMS, IRIS-T SLM from Diehl Defense of Germany and IFPC from the US.
“We in Denmark are very concerned about the situation with the ground-based air defense system, because we don’t have one,” Lund Poulsen said. He expects the government to be able to make a decision “before the summer”.
“I am very happy that France has told me directly that they will be willing to cooperate with Denmark in this context,” the Danish minister said. “We have to see the offers that will come, but let me emphasize that it is in our interest to make a decision before the summer.”
The purchase of SAMP/T would make Denmark the EU’s first export customer for the long-range air defense system, with France and Italy currently the only users in the 27-nation bloc. Ukraine is using a donated SAMP/T system to defend the Kiev area, while Singapore is the only other export user after a 2013 purchase.
Meanwhile, Lund Poelsen commented on the US military presence in Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, where the US operates the Pituffik space base. US President Donald Trump has threatened to annex Greenland, citing security needs.
“Denmark has a long-standing good relationship with the US, including security in Greenland,” the minister said. He said Denmark has a 1951 agreement on the US presence in the territory. “So if the US would like to have more bases in Greenland, it is possible to raise this question with the Danish government. And will they do that? We would be willing to discuss that.”
Source: here
In Odessa, many wonder about the benefits of a Black Sea ceasefire with Russia – April 7, 2025
Officers and business owners of the Ukrainian navy in the port city have been pondering what Kiev could gain from a truce after it repelled Russian ships and resumed commercial shipping.
Constant Méheut joined the Ukrainian Navy on a patrol mission in the Black Sea near the southern city of Odessa to report this article.
The Ukrainian Navy patrol ship crossed the Black Sea with its 25-millimeter twin-barreled machine gun jammed on the horizon. The enemy, Russia, was nowhere in sight, but ever present. In the command room, Captain Mykhailo and his crew scanned screens that showed color-coded areas marking waters laden with Russian mines and red arrows tracking drones roaming the area.
The crew’s mission was to defend the waters off Odessa, Ukraine’s largest Black Sea port city, and keep them safe for commercial traffic. It was grueling work – clearing Russian mines by day, shooting down drones by night – but after more than a year of patrolling alongside other Ukrainian navy ships, they succeeded.
The Russian navy was pushed away from Ukrainian shores, allowing Ukraine’s commercial shipping to return to pre-war levels. On Tuesday, the fruits of Captain Mykhailo’s efforts materialized on the horizon: the silhouette of a 740-foot, Panama-flagged ship gliding toward a Ukrainian port to be loaded with grain.
“Big ship. Nice,” Captain Mykhailo said, speaking on condition that only his first name and rank be used, in accordance with Ukrainian military rules.
Kiev and Moscow committed to a cease-fire on the Black Sea last month during separate US-mediated talks, but Ukraine’s military and commercial achievements in those waters have prompted many in Odessa to ponder the question: Does Ukraine have anything to gain from such a truce?
Despite the ceasefire pledge , the countries are still negotiating whether or how it will take effect. And naval officers and business owners in Odessa have used the delay to weigh the pros and cons of the deal. A cease-fire could spare the ports from Russian drone and missile attacks, but it could also mean giving up Ukraine’s strategic advantage at sea, perhaps the only area of the battlefield where it holds the edge. (my emphasis)
“I don’t want a cease-fire,” said Tariel Khajishvili, the head of Novik LLC, a Ukrainian shipping agent operating in Odessa. “The only side that wants a ceasefire is Russia, because it no longer controls the Black Sea.”
Ukraine’s skepticism has deepened with Moscow’s conditions for a truce: the lifting of some Western economic sanctions and a return to an earlier UN-backed agreement that allowed Russia to control merchant ships leaving Ukrainian ports for weapons inspections – two demands that are a non-starter for Kiev.
“Why should we make concessions now? We have effectively closed the Black Sea,” Pavlo Palisa, a military adviser to Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski, said last week, pointing to Kiev’s success in pushing Russian ships out of key parts of the sea.
Deep mistrust also persists between the two countries. Both sides have agreed in principle to temporarily halt strikes against energy infrastructure, only to accuse each other of violations.
It remains unclear whether a ceasefire in the Black Sea will ever take effect. Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russia has refrained from attacking Ukrainian ports since last month’s talks, aligning itself with one of Kiev’s main demands, but warn that it is too early to call it a truce.
The fact that Ukraine can now afford to reject a ceasefire in the Black Sea speaks volumes about the drastic change in fortunes there.
Shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion three years ago, its warships came within 15 miles of Ukraine’s coast, close enough to fire directly at it. Captain Mykhailo, 27, recalled an attack that “destroyed a reconnaissance station” on the southern outskirts of Odessa. In the town, residents filled sandbags to fortify defensive positions, preparing for an assault.
Russia never succeeded in penetrating Odessa. But its navy controls enough of the Black Sea to block Ukrainian ports, choking the country’s economy and threatening global food security as Ukraine is a major grain exporter.
A U.N.-brokered deal in July 2022 reopened a shipping corridor for Ukrainian exports, but only under an agreement that allows Russia to inspect all merchant ships for weapons. Kiev has said Moscow deliberately slowed inspections to strangle trade. After a year, barely two dozen ships were using the corridor each month.
Russia withdrew from the agreement in July 2023, complaining about the same economic sanctions it now wants to lift, and threatened all merchant ships heading to and from Ukraine.
To restart exports, Ukraine has begun a campaign to push back against the Russian Black Sea fleet, using maritime drones and missiles to destroy or damage more than a quarter of its main warships, according to British defense intelligence. The attacks have forced the Russian fleet to retreat to the eastern part of the sea, away from Ukrainian shores, allowing Ukraine to secure a new shipping corridor hugging its coastline before entering the territorial waters of NATO members.
Capt. Mykhailo said his patrol boat – an Island-class vessel donated by the United States in 2021 – accompanies merchant ships sailing off Ukrainian shores, “providing security against mines, air strikes by Russia.”
More ships now travel through the new corridor than under the UN-backed agreement. Food exports from the Black Sea are also approaching pre-war levels. Last year, Ukraine shipped 42 million metric tons of grain and oilseeds, about 80% of its pre-war volume, according to data compiled by Ukrainian investment firm Dragon Capital.
Against this backdrop, experts see little benefit for Ukraine in a ceasefire on the Black Sea.
A return to the UN-backed agreement, as Russia has demanded, “could reverse all the success of the Ukrainian corridor secured by the Ukrainian military, especially if ship inspections are reintroduced,” said Natalia Shpygotska, senior analyst at Dragon Capital. “I don’t see why Ukraine would accept” this demand, she added. “It doesn’t make sense.”
All Ukraine could gain from a cease-fire would be an end to Russian attacks on its ports, experts say. Those attacks have damaged several ships and destroyed numerous grain containers and silos. At the height of the attacks, in the second half of 2023, the export capacity of Odessa’s ports fell by up to 20%, according to Yurii Vaskov, Ukraine’s former deputy infrastructure minister.
Captain Dmytro Pletenchuk, a spokesman for the Ukrainian navy, said that “for Ukraine, a ceasefire in the Black Sea means first and foremost stopping attacks on port infrastructure so that our grain corridor can operate without disruption.”
“There is nothing more Russia can offer us in this agreement,” he said in an interview in Odessa.
However, that offer was missing from White House statements announcing the Black Sea ceasefire last month.
Andrii Klymenko, head of the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies, said he does not expect the two sides to ever establish a maritime truce, given their conflicting demands. He suspects Russia wants to use the truce to move some of its ships back to the central part of the Black Sea, something Kiev has already warned will provoke counterattacks.
Back on Captain Mykhailo’s boat, the ceasefire seems as distant as ever. Iron boxes of machine-gun shells sit ready for use on deck. On Tuesday evening, the crew emptied several of them, firing at Russian drones heading toward Odessa and its outskirts.
“Unfortunately, we didn’t manage to shoot them down,” Captain Mykhailo said, although none appear to have hit the harbors that night, according to Ukrainian authorities.
“For me, nothing changes,” he added. “They are fighting as usual.”
Source: here
The case for a British sub-strategic nuclear deterrent – April 7, 2025
Under Donald Trump’s leadership, the United States (US) has made clear that it expects Britain and European countries to do more to bolster Euro-Atlantic security as it prioritizes East Asia. The new administration may also seek to drive a wedge between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – or at least to slow the speed at which Russia is falling into the sinosphere – meaning it may be prepared to overlook the Kremlin’s excesses in Eastern Europe. This would be deeply problematic for Britain.
If Russia is allowed to prevail in Ukraine, Moscow will seek to nullify the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and create a sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, where it is suzerain, undermining European security and endangering British interests. It should not be forgotten that the Kremlin sees Her Majesty’s government as its main rival, which it might try to punish for helping Ukraine.
At the same time, Russia’s political leaders and military commanders do not shy away from their nuclear arsenal. They see nuclear weapons as tools of political coercion and battlefield artillery, unlike their British counterparts, who traditionally see nuclear forces as weapons of last resort. Also unlike the UK, Russia has several different nuclear delivery systems, from strategic to sub-strategic, and can go through every conceivable phase of escalation. Absent the cover provided by the US nuclear umbrella, the UK may be less able (or willing) to respond to (and deter) the Kremlin’s escalation efforts without the ability to mount a proportionate response of its own.
Box 1: British nuclear deterrence
Unique among the five established nuclear powers, Britain has opted for a single delivery system for its nuclear weapons. Britain’s nuclear arsenal is in the hands of the Royal Navy. Based on four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), deterrence is continuously at sea. Each British SSBN can carry 16 Trident II missiles, which together can contain 192 warheads, each with a yield of up to 100 kilotons. However, the deterrent system has never operated at full capacity and was further reduced in the 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review to just eight Trident II missiles, containing 40 warheads. It is not clear whether this approach has been changed, given that HM Government has again embarked on a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ and committed to increasing the stockpile of available nuclear warheads in the 2021 Integrated Review.
While it is feasible for the UK to use Trident in a sub-strategic role – each of the Royal Navy’s SSBNs is fitted with a Trident missile armed with a single low-yield warhead – its use in such a role would increase the risk of SSBN detection and therefore interception. Even then, the substrategic launch of a Trident II missile risks inadvertent escalation, as Russia may misinterpret it as a strategic one aimed at its national centers of gravity, causing it to respond in kind.
But the growing uncertainty of American intentions does not just affect Britain. So anxious are the Poles and Germans that Donald Tusk, Poland’s prime minister, and Friedrich Merz, Germany’s likely next chancellor, have called for additional layers of nuclear deterrence beyond those provided by America. Recent polls in Germany show growing support for such an initiative. There is a growing risk that Poland and Germany, as well as Norway, Sweden, Finland and Romania, will look to others for nuclear security. In the absence of British leadership, their only option would be to look to France, the other European nuclear power in NATO. If Paris is willing to alter its nuclear doctrine and take steps to extend its nuclear umbrella to its European allies, France would almost certainly gain pervasive influence – even executive power – over the direction of European geopolitics.
Another risk is that Poland and others will begin developing their own nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation could enhance the ability of European states to deter Russian aggression in the long term by creating additional nuclear decision-making centers. Proliferation would have other negative consequences, including undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear proliferation would also unbalance the European dynamic, creating a new order of ha haves and have-nots, and risk pre-emptive Russian military intervention.
There should be no misunderstanding here; because of its history and geography, Poland above all – and regardless of the color of the ruling party in Warsaw – will do everything in its power to prevent the rise of Russian power in Eastern Europe. And Poland now has an increasingly sophisticated economy that has seen high growth in recent years; it is not beyond Poland’s capacity to develop a nuclear deterrent, which, because of geographic proximity, would not need to be expanded to force the Kremlin to factor it into any strategic calculations. However, building an independent nuclear deterrent would take time – perhaps a decade – and consume substantial resources that might otherwise be devoted to conventional rearmament.
Consequently, the time has come for Britain to regenerate a sub-strategic nuclear deterrent… While there are other options to boost deterrence at the sub-strategic level – such as offensive cyber, massive airburst weapons, and conventional deep strike – nothing deters (or reassures) like nuclear forces, especially when they offer flexibility in response.
Consequently, the time has come for Britain to regenerate a sub-strategic nuclear deterrent. This has nothing to do with the yield of nuclear warheads: a sub-strategic (or ‘theater-level’) capability is determined by the method of delivery, which should not be strategic, i.e. by intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from silos or submarines. While there are other options to boost deterrence at the sub-strategic level – such as offensive cyber, massive air blast weapons, and conventional deep strike – nothing deters (or reassures) like nuclear forces, especially when they offer flexibility in response. While potentially highly disruptive, cyber attacks lack the aura of extreme violence, massive airburst weapons are cumbersome and therefore vulnerable to interception, and conventional deep strikes would not be enough to appease nervous allies.
The UK maintained a sub-strategic nuclear system until 1998, when nuclear depth charges and free-fall bombs based on the WE.177 warhead were withdrawn from service due to the end of the Cold War. Regeneration of such a capability would offer Britain a number of powerful advantages.
First, it would provide additional levels of deterrence; Russia might feel less confident in testing British resolve along the NATO border, knowing that the government has nuclear options beyond a full strategic strike should the conflict escalate rapidly. Britain’s closest NATO allies would like to see the development of a British substrategic deterrent.
Second, with a different level of nuclear capability, Britain would be less dependent on the whims of the US president. While full operational control is in the hands of the prime minister, Trident II missiles are ultimately dependent on the US for long-term maintenance. If the Americans threaten to withdraw their support because of differences over geostrategic policy, HM government might feel compelled to acquiesce to US demands because it would take urgent and very costly steps to implement a fully self-sustaining UK system. Having an alternative, albeit less powerful, nuclear system might discourage the Americans from ever threatening such an outcome if they end up not favoring a particular British policy.
Finally, a British substrategic nuclear deterrent would ensure that France would not remain as Europe’s leading nuclear power. Indeed, if Britain were to share substrategic weapons with nervous allies such as Poland, Germany, Finland, and Romania, similar to the way the Americans share their nukes with Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Turkey, Europeans might be discouraged from looking to France for security guarantees as well – with all the political leverage Paris would gain – or from opting for their own nuclear programs. Instead, it would increase their dependence on Britain, with all the resulting benefits in terms of geopolitical influence.
In terms of cost, developing a British sub-strategic nuclear system would not be cheap; but neither would it be excessively expensive, especially if European allies such as Germany, Poland and others helped to fund it. There is a wide range of options, from trying to refit the WE.177 gravity bombs and depth charges that Britain gave up in the 1990s, to refitting modified Trident II warheads to the Storm Shadow cruise missiles.
In conclusion, because of the gravity of the situation in Europe, the quickest, not the most refined, delivery route should be sought. To generate maximum flexibility in terms of escalation management and strategic advantage in terms of geopolitical control over European affairs, HM Government should begin to explore options to implement a British sub-strategic deterrent without delay.
Dr. Marc DeVore is a Senior Lecturer at the University of St. Andrews and Sir Halford Mackinder Associate Fellow in Black Sea Geopolitics at the Geostrategy Council. He writes in a personal capacity.
James Rogers is co-founder (research) at the Geostrategy Council.
Source: here
How the Houthis fooled Washington – April 8, 2025
The Yemeni terrorist group skillfully took advantage of an overstretched U.S. Navy.
Yemeni Houthis refuse to leave. Despite the best efforts of the US Navy and allies, an insurgent rebel group has managed to block one of the world’s most strategic waterways – the Red Sea – for nearly two years. Most sea traffic was forced to follow the longer, more circuitous and costly Cape of Good Hope route around the tip of Africa. Washington failed to maintain maritime freedom in one of the world’s key maritime chokepoints.
The technological revolution in naval warfare brought about by anti-ship missile and drone systems has given a small rebel group the ability to cut the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea. This continuing standoff has dangerous implications for the United States as a global maritime power .
The first lesson is obviously technology. Drones and ground-based missile systems can now shoot down surface warships hundreds or even thousands of kilometers off the coastlines. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea underscore the predicament the US Navy finds itself in. Already no longer the largest navy in the world – after ceding that position to China – the Navy is looking for new approaches to deal with drones and anti-ship missiles. Aircraft carriers and other warships, equipped with expensive and sophisticated missile systems and manned airplanes, have proven less suited to this new era of warfare. Evolving to counter these weapons is a process that could take years for the Navy and Congress to develop and refine.
The second lesson is that the Navy is overstretched. It has been forced to maintain up to two carrier battle groups stuck in the Red Sea area to repel Houthi attacks against warships and merchant vessels. Despite these strong forces, the Red Sea remains effectively blockaded. Meanwhile, competing challenges in other parts of the world continue to demand the Navy’s attention, especially China’s. Immediately in front of the more than 400 warships of the People’s Liberation Army is the US Pacific Fleet of about 200 ships.
It is highly doubtful that the Navy will ever be as big as China’s navy. America’s ageing shipyards do not have the production capacity. The Pacific Fleet’s main mission is however to defend the U.S. treaty allies, the Philippines, Japan and South Korea, in any conflict with China. It must also be prepared to defend Taiwan even without a defense agreement commitment.
In addition to China and the Houthis, the Navy must also be prepared for Iran. Earlier this year, it was called on to help defend Israel from waves of Iranian missile and drone attacks, even while simultaneously defending against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. A major Navy strike on Iran’s nuclear program could be imminent.
In the face of all of these diverse challenges, the need to tie one or more U.S. carrier battle groups to the Red Sea – to play costly and dangerous Houthi missile and drone strikes – becomes a costly and ultimately unsustainable proposition in the long run.
Presumably realizing this, the Trump administration has just escalated the Houthi campaign, putting more air power assets (including Air Force B2s) into a more offensive effort to defeat the Houthis once and for all. It remains to be seen whether airpower will be enough to deliver a decisive victory. Early results suggest that accelerated airpower may not be enough. Despite reported expenditures of over $1 billion in aerial munitions in just three weeks, Houthi attacks from the Red Sea have continued unabated. If airpower cannot permanently silence the Houthis, Washington will have a difficult decision to make.
One option is simply to withdraw from the Red Sea and let European allies continue to deal militarily with the Houthis. After all, Western Europe is more economically dependent on access to the Red Sea transportation route than the United States. In addition, Washington’s European allies have more than 1,000 warships at their disposal. Unlike the land-based military situation in Europe, where NATO allies have fewer military capabilities to deal with Russia and Ukraine, their navies should be up to the task in the Red Sea, even if the US Navy withdraws. No doubt this was what Vice President JD Vance had in mind when he recently criticized the Europeans as “profiteering” in the Red Sea campaign.
However, especially in the wake of America’s hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, US withdrawal from the fight would be the wrong message to send to Iran. It would be interpreted as another sign of US strategic decline. Instead, the Trump administration’s decision to escalate signals that the United States remains committed to protecting the freedom of the seas in far-flung places, even in situations where America’s economic interests are less affected than those of allied nations.
In 1988, the United States did just that against Iran in Operation Praying Mantis, after an American frigate, the USS Samuel B Roberts, was damaged by an Iranian mine. In response, the United States attacked and sank Iranian warships and destroyed Iranian oil rigs in what was the US Navy’s largest action since World War II.
While the Houthis have yet to hit a U.S. warship or manned aircraft, they continue to try. If airpower alone cannot eliminate the threat, the United States may have to weigh further escalation, including potential naval quarantines and ground raids. The Houthis have put the United States in a strategic box, leaving no good options. Washington’s credibility cannot continue to afford a prolonged stalemate and stalemate. This is a conflict the United States must resolve or pay the strategic consequences. There may come a time when Washington will have no choice but to escalate further or be forced to face another Afghanistan-like failure, this time at the hands of the Houthis.
Ramon Marks is a retired international lawyer who writes regularly on national security issues.
Source: here
What Latin America can teach Trump about tariffs – April 8, 2025
The theory of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and the accompanying high tariffs have brought economic dysfunction and stagnation to the region.
In the 1950s, Latin American countries tried to develop by imposing major tariffs. This model of development was called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). President Trump mimics Latin American policy in many ways, from his populist and personalistic approach to politics to his emphasis on immigration control. The recent “Liberation Day tariffs” also have a distinctly Latin American flavor. To see if they will succeed, we should look at what happened to the original case. The conclusion is that without massive state investment, ISI is doomed to fail.
Import substitution industrialization (ISI ) emerged in Latin America in the mid-20th century. It involved the promotion of indigenous industries to replace imported goods in order to achieve economic independence and boost local production.
The roots of the ISI can be traced back to the economic crises and global events of the 1930s, in particular the Great Depression. Latin American economies, heavily dependent on primary commodity exports, faced severe downturns as global demand collapsed. In response, many countries have begun to rethink their economic strategies, moving away from dependence on foreign markets and goods. The failure of the export-led growth model prompted governments to adopt FDI to boost national development.
The initial implementation of ISI was spurred by the need to create jobs, stimulate local economies and reduce vulnerability to external shocks. Countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have taken the lead in this movement, instituting policies that have favored the growth of local industries. Protectionist measures, such as tariffs on imported goods and subsidies for local industries, became commonplace.
The ISI strategy involved a series of stages, starting with the production of simple consumer goods and moving to more complex manufactured products. In the early years, countries focused on industries such as textiles, food processing and consumer electronics. Over time, the focus broadened to include capital goods and heavy industries such as steel and machinery.
Governments have played a central role in the ISI’s success. They set up state-owned enterprises, provided financial support to developing industries and implemented protective tariffs to shield local businesses from foreign competition. For example, the Brazilian government nationalized the steel industry in the 1940s, creating the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) to launch local production.
Despite its initial successes, the ISI was not without its challenges. A critical flaw was that many industries relied heavily on imported raw materials and intermediate goods, which limited the degree of economic independence. In addition, the focus on domestic markets sometimes led to inefficiencies, as local firms faced little competition and lacked incentives to innovate.
In the initial phases, the ISI produced notable successes. Countries such as Argentina experienced rapid industrial growth in the 1940s and 1950s, with significant increases in manufacturing output and urbanization.
Moreover, the ISI led to the emergence of a flourishing middle class in several Latin American countries. As industries expanded, demand for skilled labor increased, encouraging education and professional development. The social structure of many nations began to change, with urbanization leading to changes in lifestyles and consumption patterns.
However, the limitations of the ISI became increasingly apparent in the 1970s. Dependence on import substitution created an unsustainable economic model that often led to inflation, balance of payments crises and economic stagnation. Inefficient sheltered industries led to high costs for consumers and a lack of innovation.
In addition, the global economic landscape began to change, with oil crises and shifts towards globalization and neoliberal policies. As countries faced mounting debts and economic turmoil, the ISI model came into focus. By the 1980s, many Latin American nations began to shift toward export-led growth strategies, liberalizing their economies and reducing trade barriers.
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in ISI, albeit in a modified form. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerabilities of global supply chains, prompting some countries to reconsider their reliance on imports. Latin American nations are now exploring ways to strengthen local production capacities, particularly in critical sectors such as pharmaceuticals, technology and food security.
However, the contemporary approach of the ISI is more nuanced, focusing on sustainable development and innovation rather than simple protectionism. Policymakers are increasingly aware of the need to integrate local industries into global value chains, harness technology and encourage partnerships to enhance competitiveness.
Trump’s tariffs are ISI for an already developed state that does not fundamentally rely on imported raw materials. As such, the ISI model is not a good fit. Moreover, without large state investment, American ISI is unlikely to succeed. This is in stark contrast to China, where state-owned enterprises are pillars of the economy.
There is a possibility that Trump’s tariffs are primarily political tools, not economic policies. The president may intend to grant tariff exemptions to firms that support his policy agenda one way or another. If Trump can compel such firms to make large investments in key industries, they would effectively be proxies for state investment. This is a major gamble, but it is the only way his tariff plan can work.
Diego von Vacano, PhD, MPP. is a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin America Program, and the Environmental Change and Security Program. He is a full professor of political science at the Bush School of Government, Texas A&M University. Originally from Bolivia, he is writing a book on Bolivia’s lithium sector for Oxford University Press. He earned his PhD in politics from Princeton and his master’s in economic development from the Harvard Kennedy School.
Source: here