Lessons learned applicable to the Romanian Naval Forces: strategic perspectives and needs for modernisation and equipment–Author Admiral (rtr) PhD. Aurel POPA president Maritime Security Forum
“The ultimate goal of maritime power
is to ensure freedom of action at sea
and deny the same freedom to the enemy.”
Sir Julian Corbett – British historian and naval strategist
NOTE
This chapter reflects the author’s own analysis of some of the lessons identified as well as proposals applicable to the Romanian Naval Forces. Certainly the RNF have their own analysis and have clearly set out the directions regarding the equipping and perspective plans which may not coincide with our judgements.
The conflict in Ukraine and the aggressive expansion of the Russian military presence in the Black Sea basin have reconfigured maritime security paradigms in NATO’s Eastern flank. In this context, the Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) are called to adopt an adaptive strategic path, based on the operational lessons learnt from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Learning from recent mistakes and successes becomes essential to calibrate the structural and operational efficiency of the FNR in relation to the new regional strategic requirements.
The analysis of the degradation of Russia’s naval capabilities in the period 2022-2025 and the assessment of the impact of these developments on Romania’s maritime defence posture converge towards several fundamental conclusions. First, the nature of maritime warfare has radically transformed, going beyond the paradigm of symmetric confrontations in favour of a hybrid reality, characterised by operational autonomy, extended mobility, advanced networking and doctrinal adaptability. Second, Russia’s inability to protect its naval infrastructure, anticipate asymmetric threats and integrate complex platforms into modern C2 (command and control) architectures is a warning to any littoral state with naval aspirations in the region.
For Romania, the lessons are clear: maritime survival and efficiency in the 21st century will not depend on tonnage or numbers, but on the quality of interoperability, the ability to anticipate and the degree of systemic resilience. The FNR (Romanian Naval Forces) must become a compact, agile and intelligent force, capable of integrating both national capabilities and the strategic and technological networks of NATO and the European Union.
Lessons learnt from the regional and allied context
Vulnerability of critical maritime infrastructure
The attacks by Russian forces on Ukrainian ports, in particular Odessa and Chornomorsk, have clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the logistical and energy infrastructure in the maritime space. This lesson is directly applicable to Romania, which must invest as a matter of priority in air defence and anti-drone capabilities to protect the ports of Constanța, Mangalia and Midia and the ports on the Danube. The protection of dual-use infrastructure in times of conflict becomes an essential element of national resilience.
The importance of integrated maritime surveillance
NATO-coordinated ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) operations in the Black Sea have emphasised the value of data fusion between land, air, sea and space platforms. For the Romanian Naval Forces, a strategic priority is the full integration of their own platforms into the allied C4ISR network to enable early warning, real-time decision making and information support in modern naval combat.
Relevance of asymmetric capabilities and tactical mobility
Russia has demonstrated an increased level of tactical adaptability, effectively utilising naval and aerial drones, smart sea mines and mobile coastal strike systems. These hard-to-predict and cost-effective asymmetric tools can disrupt conventional operations. The NRF must adapt its doctrine to include a fleet of fast, modular, low radar footprint naval assets capable of operating in a decentralised regime and in contested environments.
Civil-military co-operation in the maritime context
The Norwegian, Polish and British models have emphasised that maritime resilience cannot be achieved by military means alone. Joint civil-military planning is needed, particularly in protecting critical infrastructure and maritime logistics chains. In Romania, cooperation between the Romanian Navy, ARSVOM, the Administration of Sea Ports and the Department for Emergency Situations (DSU) needs to be strengthened through joint simulations, exercises and operational protocols.
Operational lessons from the Black Sea theatre and implications for Romania
Purchase of modern multifunctional platforms
The transformation of the Romanian Naval Forces into a relevant actor in the Black Sea region requires adapting to new naval warfare paradigms, as tested and validated (or disproved) in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted traditional naval vulnerabilities and accelerated the transition to a distributed, asymmetric and smart-network-based maritime doctrine.
New-generation multifunctional corvettes
- The Ukrainian experience has shown that large, slow and poorly defended naval platforms (such as the Moskva) become easy targets in the absence of a modern air and drone defence system. The battleships of the future must include:
– Integrated air, missile and artillery defence systems (e.g. MICA VL, RAM, close defence artillery systems);
– multi-spectrum sensors (EO/IR, AESA radar, LPI);
– active electromagnetic defence (ECM, decoy launchers).
Key lesson: Survivability depends on early detection, mobility and autonomous layered defence.
Submarines and deep-sea deterrence
- Russia, in the absence of Ukraine’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities (ships or helicopters) has effectively utilised its Kilo-class submarines to launch Kalibr missiles against land targets. However, their lack of tactical mobility and the absence of sonar dominance in the Black Sea limited their operational effectiveness.
Romania can exploit this strategic vacuum by acquiring an AIP submarine (Scorpène class[1] /212CD) or other type with capabilities:
– Advanced Underwater ISR;
– Launching submersible attack and research drones (UUV);
– launching missiles from immersion;
– support for special forces and clandestine operations.
Key lesson: submarines are no longer just attack platforms, but underwater nodes of strategic networking.
Autonomous aerial and naval drones
- Ukraine has managed to destabilise Russian naval dominance off Crimea with improvised, remote-controlled naval drones and UAVs equipped with reconnaissance and strike systems.
For Romania, this model confirms the need for:
– USV (naval surface UAV) flotilla with sensors and modular payload;
– Marine UAV with extended autonomy and closed-loop AI for immediate response to threats;
-capable vessels for aerial, naval surface or submarine drone operations
– portable C2 platforms for distributed control of these drones.
Key lesson: speed, dispersion and artificial intelligence compensate for numerical inferiority.
OPVs and dual-capable patrol vessels
- Ukraine’s maritime surveillance and control operations have been facilitated by fast, easy-to-maintain platforms capable of operating in highly contested environments. Romania needs to acquire modern OPVs:
– with lightweight drone and helicopter decks;
– capable of multiple refuelling (for sustained operations);
-capable of integrating into regionally constituted naval groups of EU, NATO or Partnership for Peace vessels;
– interoperable with NATO maritime patrol systems.
Key lesson: permanent naval presence is not just about power, it is complemented by relevant and resilient presence.
Reconfiguring frigates and digitising the existing fleet
- Romania’s Type 22 frigates urgently need to be upgraded to cope with the new generation of threats. A lesson from the conflict: analogue platforms, not integrated in C4ISR networks and without drone protection, are obsolete in the first wave.
Recommendations:
– Integration of LPI radar and ESM sensors for electromagnetic spectrum;
– Implementation of modern CIWS (e.g. SeaRAM);
– Real-time connection to the NATO C2 network.
Key lesson: modernisation in the absence of connectivity does not provide superiority, only temporary survival.
Mine warfare and mine counter-mining capabilities
- Smart mines placed by Russia have blocked harbours, shipping channels and trade routes. Romania needs to create a specialised mine warfare component:
– mine-hunting vessels equipped with autonomous underwater drones;
– Marine LIDAR sonar sensors and magnetic detection systems;
– rapid intervention capability in critical harbour areas;
-developing/procurement of own smart mines and the ships and air assets to launch them.
Key lesson: sea mines are low-cost, high-impact strategic weapons that require dedicated, not improvised responses.
Final recommendations on the purchase of OPVs
The Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) are faced with the need to rapidly adapt their capabilities, and the acquisition of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) platforms is an urgent and unavoidable strategic priority, also due to the fact that the acquisition of multirole corvettes is on the horizon.
In this context, MVNOs are an essential doctrinal element capable of ensuring:
- Permanent naval presence along the entire length of the national coastline;
- Surveillance and control of territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) ;[2]
- Rapid reaction capability in maritime law enforcement, drone neutralisation, escort and critical infrastructure protection.
OPVs allow for variable armament and configuration, adaptable to diverse missions – from patrolling, search and rescue, anti-smuggling, rapid intervention or low-intensity military action[3] . Compared to large platforms (frigates or corvettes), OPVs have low operating costs and increased logistical autonomy, ensuring the deployment of long-duration missions in the Black Sea environment. The characteristics of contemporary naval conflict – the proliferation of surface and underwater drones, smart mines, fast attack craft – require agile, resilient platforms equipped with modern sensors and rapid response capabilities. The emergence of risks in the Danube Delta, the Snake Island area and in the vicinity of offshore infrastructure clearly justifies the need for OPVs[4]
The integration of OPVs would directly address the current challenges in the Black Sea area:
| Operational area | Strategic function OPV |
| The Danube Delta and its own coastline | Surveillance, rapid response, river-sea control |
| Offshore Exclusive Economic Zone | Protection of energy resources, escort, continuous naval presence |
| Snake Island and surroundings | Deterrence, maritime traffic control, combating hybrid activities |
Recent examples from NATO and EU littoral states confirm the trend towards the integration of OPVs as a central element of eastern flank naval strategies. Italy, France, Poland or Turkey have already adapted their naval strategies by integrating OPVs into their naval force structures[5]
The lack of VPOs in the structure of the FNR risks to make Romanian maritime control vulnerable and increase dependence on external partners and would expose the Romanian state to the following vulnerabilities :[6]
- inability to permanently monitor the EEZ;
- Overloading frigates/corvettes on routine missions;
- Increased vulnerability to asymmetric and hybrid actions;
- excessive dependence on NATO partners for the protection of its own maritime infrastructure.
The urgent procurement of a minimum of 4-6 modern OPVs for the Romanian Naval Forces is an irreplaceable strategic investment, justified by the operational realities in the Black Sea post-2022, NATO doctrinal standards and the need to protect Romania’s economic and security interests in an increasingly contested and unstable maritime environment .[7]
Naval infrastructure and logistics
Modernisation of military shipyards and conversion of Mangalia and Constanța Sud ports into dual-use infrastructure
Naval industrial capacity is a determining factor in underpinning strategic autonomy and regional military resilience. In this respect, the modernisation of military shipyards in Romania – especially in Mangalia – must be linked to the conversion of the ports of Constanța Sud and Mangalia into dual-use infrastructures capable of serving both commercial and collective defence needs.
This kind of conversion involves:
- Digitalisation of naval production chains, integration of advanced technologies for the construction and maintenance of combat and logistic support ships;
- Adaptation of port infrastructure to NATO operational requirements (e.g. depths for large tonnage ships, militarised logistic terminals, fast refuelling and repair points);
- Establishment of rapid storage and mobilisation facilities for military equipment in the vicinity of ports, with immediate regional projection capability;
- Cyber and physical security of ports, including through public-private partnerships with relevant EU maritime operators.
These investments would turn Romania’s south-eastern area into a strategic hub for allied naval support in the Black Sea, with the potential to replicate the model in other areas of NATO interest.
Implementation of a NATO integrated logistics hub in the Dobrogea area
The Dobrogea area – with its port, road and rail infrastructure, as well as its proximity to the Allied Eastern Front – is the ideal place for a NATO integrated logistics hub, designed for the rapid mobilisation of forces and resources in the context of crises in the Pontic and wider MENA (Middle East and North Africa) area.
Functions:
- Strategic redistribution node for equipment and troops, connected to European military corridors (e.g. Rhine-Danube Corridor);
- Integrated logistics command point, interoperable with multinational structures deployed in Romania (e.g. NATO Force Integration Unit, Multinational Division South-East);
- Real-time support coordination centre equipped with digital and AI infrastructure for supply chain management in operational theatres;
- Platform for multinational logistical exercises, included in the NATO annual calendar.
The Hub would strengthen Romania’s role in NATO’s logistical build-up and would directly contribute to increased force projection and deterrence capabilities in the Black Sea region.
Strengthening electronic warfare (EW) and naval cyber defence capabilities
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has brought to the fore an essential strategic truth: technological superiority is useless without protection of the electromagnetic spectrum and critical digital networks. In the Black Sea theatre, Russia has aggressively and effectively used jamming systems (Krasukha-4, Murmansk-BN, Tirada-2S) and targeted cyber attacks to annihilate tactical communications, induce glitches in adversary GPS systems, and block data transmission between ISR platforms and fire units.
Key lessons from the conflict:
- Ukrainian drones (aerial and naval) have been neutralised on several occasions by Russian EM jamming, especially near Crimea.
- Naval platforms equipped with C4ISR have become vulnerable in the absence of encryption and communications redundancy.
- In the absence of a naval cyber ecosystem, port and logistics infrastructure has been subject to cyber-attacks causing operational delays and loss of critical data.
For Romania, the implications are clear:
Development of an integrated EW architecture for the Romanian Naval Forces:
Equip main ships (corvettes, frigates) with active jamming equipment and naval and airborne target imitation systems (DRFM, GNSS spoofing, directed ECM);
– Installation of R-ESM/ELINT systems for early detection of enemy EM sources;
– Training crews in combat scenarios in GPS-denied environments.
Naval Cyber Defence (CyberDef-Maritime):
Implementation of a Maritime Cyber Operations Cell within the FNR, in collaboration with the Cyber Defence Command of MApN;
– Cyber hardening of command and control (C2) systems, armaments and on-board sensors;
– Introduction of naval environment specific Red Teaming Exercises within NATO joint exercises (e.g. Cyber Coalition, Locked Shields, Sea Shield, Opex Edt );[8]
– Creation of a national alert and response protocol in case of cyber attack on Romanian harbours and AIS/navtex systems.
Multinational co-operation:
Interoperability between the EW/Cyber capabilities of the FNR and those of the naval forces of Poland, Turkey, Bulgaria and the UK;
– Participation in real-time data exchange and alert networks through NATO MARCOM and EU CyCLONe ;[9]
– Promotion of a regional Maritime Cyber Resilience Hub concept with proposed headquarters in Constanța, ensuring exchange of best practices, simulations and joint response to EM and cyber crises.
Doctrinal and institutional recommendations
Against the background of the new strategic realities generated by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the degradation of Russian maritime capabilities in the Black Sea, the doctrinal adaptation of the allied naval forces in the region is becoming a priority. Romania, as a neighbouring state and NATO member, must bring its structures and training into line with the new Western naval operational paradigms.
a. Adoption of the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept
The application of DMO involves the dispersion of naval forces along multiple operational axes while maintaining real-time tactical and information co-ordination. This model increases resilience against concentrated attacks and allows flexible force projection under hybrid warfare conditions. DMO is already adopted by the US Navy and adapted within NATO, and is an essential doctrine for fifth-generation maritime warfare.
b. Enhanced participation in relevant multinational exercises
Exercises such as Sea Breeze, Poseidon and BALTOPS provide an ideal operational framework for testing naval capabilities in complex scenarios, from electronic warfare and anti-submarine warfare to harbour security and maritime logistics. Romania must increase its participation and initiative in these formats, including by hosting specialised modules in the Black Sea area.
c. The foundation of a School of Hybrid Doctrine and Naval Innovation, an institution with proposed headquarters in Constanta and affiliated to an international academic-military consortium, would ensure:
- Develop doctrines adapted to the hybrid maritime environment (drones, cyber warfare, naval disinformation);
- Knowledge transfer between theorists, practitioners and the naval defence industry;
- Training officers specialised in emerging concepts such as Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T), A2/AD countering and underwater critical infrastructure protection;
- Active integration in NATO and EU research and innovation networks.
This school could constitute a regional centre of excellence in emerging maritime doctrine with long-term impact on collective security in the region.
Recommendations trans regional
Adoption of a framework for extended NATO-EU-NATO naval co-operation with neighbouring partners
The Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea are interdependent maritime security zones. Establishment of a NATO-EU-Partner Tri-Regional Maritime Platform for the Eastern Flank It is recommended that a Tri-Regional Maritime Platform be established to link naval doctrines and rapid response initiatives among NATO member and partner states with an opening to the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. This platform would aim to:
- The doctrinal and operational alignment of the naval forces of Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Croatia, in co-operation with strategic Eastern partners – Ukraine and Georgia.
- Expanded interoperability between naval and civilian forces (coasts, harbours, army, maritime administration), with a focus on critical infrastructure resilience, combined surveillance (C4ISR), intelligence sharing and strategic maritime traffic control.
- Joint training and real-time data exchange through tactical exercises and cyber and hybrid simulation campaigns in coordination with NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).
- Support collective security through a regional network of naval centres of excellence, including a possible Centre for Asymmetric Maritime Operations in Constanța.
- Complementarity of forces available for joint mission-centred actions.
This initiative would help strengthen cohesion on the Eastern flank and reinforce the maritime security architecture in an era of hybrid warfare, strategic competition and regional energy insecurity.[10]
Creation of a European Maritime Critical Infrastructure Defence Network (EM-CN-CMIRN)
In the area of heightened vulnerabilities of critical maritime infrastructure in Europe – such as gas pipelines, submarine communication cables, offshore platforms and naval logistic hubs – the establishment of a European Maritime Critical Infrastructure Defence Network (EM-CN-CM-CIMN) is becoming essential. This network would function as a coordinated mechanism for surveillance, protection, rapid response and information exchange, integrating the resources of Member States, European agencies and strategic industrial actors.
Inspired by existing initiatives at NATO and EU level to protect submarine cables in the North Atlantic and North Sea – such as NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell or the bilateral cooperation between the UK, Norway and Germany – RE-AICM would extend this operational framework to the European Union maritime space, with a focus on:
- Monitor and protect maritime critical infrastructure through joint artificial intelligence platforms, satellites, ships and maritime drones;
- Implement common resilience standards for private and public operators involved in infrastructure management;
- Regular interoperability exercises between national navies, civil protection agencies and port authorities;
- Setting up a European Maritime Incident Response Cell (EU-MAR-CERT) to detect, analyse and counter cyber or physical attacks on infrastructures.
The proposal contributes to reinforcing European strategic autonomy and aligns with EU priorities on energy security, defence of digital communications and protection of maritime supply chains.
Supporting the development of a “digital fleet” in the wider Black Sea area
In the geopolitics marked by Russian military aggression and the reconfiguration of the strategic balance in the Black Sea region, the transition towards a “digital fleet”, capable of operating autonomously, efficiently and interconnected in complex and contested environments, is becoming urgent. This digital fleet would integrate:
- Naval patrol and attack drones capable of operating in denied access (A2/AD) conditions;
- Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) for sea mine detection, electronic spying and reconnaissance in hard-to-reach areas;
- AI systems analysing real-time maritime traffic and underwater acoustic signatures for early warning and decision support;
- C4ISR capabilities integrated (command, control, communications, computers, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) into the EU and NATO defence architecture.
Black Sea littoral states, such as Romania and Turkey, together with Poland (as a regional actor with experience in military technology development and transatlantic partnerships), should act as hubs of innovation and operational experimentation for the implementation of this new naval paradigm. The initiative could be supported by European funds (e.g. European Defence Fund, PESCO) and partnerships with the defence industry, including through the involvement of strategic players such as MBDA, Rheinmetall, Havelsan or emerging companies in the field of robotics and artificial intelligence.
It is a strategic direction that will enable the Black Sea region to break out of the vulnerability paradigm and become a European maritime military innovation laboratory, enhancing deterrence and rapid response to hybrid threats.
The proliferation of hybrid threats and the systematic use of strategic denial tactics by the Russian Federation in the Black Sea area requires the strengthening of doctrinal interoperability between allied and partner naval forces in the region. A viable solution is the establishment of a Regional Maritime Hybrid Warfare Readiness Centre for Hybrid Maritime Warfare (RMARHWC), with proposed headquarters in Constanța, Romania – a geostrategically relevant port and military infrastructure already partially adapted to NATO requirements, capable of developing:
- Joint training modules in electronic warfare, jamming tactics and neutralisation of enemy communications;
- Applied courses on the use of naval and aerial drones in reconnaissance, surveillance and precision strike missions;
- Advanced simulations of amphibious operations and rapid landings, with a focus on joint cooperation;
- Specialised training for the detection, neutralisation and disposal of sea mines, including autonomous and semi-autonomous robotic systems;
- Joint table-top and live exercises coordinated with experts from NATO centres of excellence and European military institutions.
The HPRMRC could be developed in synergy with existing initiatives such as the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Helsinki) and the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (Crete), but would specifically address the needs of adaptation to hybrid maritime warfare in the Pontic context.
Through its functioning, the centre would not only contribute to increasing the joint response capability, but also to building a common body of knowledge and operational practice in the Euro-Atlantic area, strengthening the strategic link between the Eastern flank and NATO’s central structures.
The Romanian Naval Forces must adopt a coherent modernisation strategy, based on the relevant lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian war and calibrated according to the current geopolitical dynamics of NATO’s Eastern flank. This strategy cannot be reactive or piecemeal, but must be multidimensional, integrative and long-term oriented.
Possible approaches for the Romanian Navy – Strategic Multidimensionality
The war in the Black Sea has demonstrated that naval power projection no longer depends exclusively on tonnage, armour or armaments, but on the fusion of traditional capabilities with emerging technologies. We can see for exemplification the use of naval drones by Ukraine has highlighted the importance of autonomous systems in contemporary maritime conflicts. The NRF therefore needs to extend its doctrine beyond classical approaches, taking stakes in areas such as.
- Electronic warfare (EW) and naval cyber defence;
- Autonomous systems and maritime drones, including the possibility to operate them on board ships;
- Artificial intelligence applied in ISR and maritime traffic analysis;
- Distributed maritime operations and active dispersion tactics.
We are facing a new paradigm that requires an institutional culture that integrates both technological innovation and doctrinal adaptability.
Allied and civil-military integration
No littoral state can manage the complexities of modern maritime threats alone. Romania must continue the full integration of the NRF into NATO C4ISR networks, as well as proactively participate in the development of integrated regional capabilities, especially with Turkey and Poland. Civil-military cooperation must be strengthened, both in the field of port defence and logistical infrastructure, and in the management of critical maritime resources. The resilience models tested in Norway, Poland or the United Kingdom demonstrate that an effective national maritime strategy is an inter-institutional one based on realistic rapid response scenarios. [11]
Long-term projection and structural resilience
The NRF needs a coherent long-term vision, in which acquisition, training, doctrine and infrastructure projects are linked and logically sequenced. Romania’s recent plans to acquire new warships to strengthen its Black Sea fleet emphasise the importance of such a vision. Multifunctional corvettes, light corvettes, submarines, naval drones or EW capabilities should not be seen as isolated acquisitions, but as parts of a coherent and resilient naval ecosystem. We envisage:
- Reforming naval military education through a hybrid doctrine and innovation school;
- Participation of naval forces and shipyards in EU-initiated projects such as the European Patrol Corvette project;
- Investments in dual-use infrastructure (Mangalia, Constanța Sud);
- A predictable legislative and budgetary framework to allow the gradual implementation of the new naval architecture.
This is a decisive moment for Romania’s maritime future. The transformation of the Naval Forces is not only a military necessity, but a strategic imperative that will determine the Romanian state’s ability to act as a security provider in the Black Sea and guarantor of the Eastern flank in the coming decades.
Changing the model: from passive defence to active deterrence. The need to redefine the role of the Romanian Naval Forces in NATO’s maritime security architecture
Central argument:
“NATO does not defend what a member state is not prepared to defend on its own.”[12]
Over the last thirty years, the development of the Romanian Naval Forces has been deeply marked by a doctrinal perception specific to the post-NATO accession period, characterised by a minimalist, defensive approach, which privileged the idea that membership in the North Atlantic alliance automatically equals guaranteed security of the national maritime space.
This pattern of almost exclusive strategic dependence on NATO has inevitably led to chronic under-funding of the Romanian naval component, stagnation of modernisation programmes and neglect of building its own naval deterrence and projection capabilities .[13]
The events unfolding in the wider Black Sea region in the period 2022-2025 – generated by the Russian-Ukrainian war – have demonstrated with undeniable clarity that the survival of a littoral state in the face of a direct military threat cannot depend exclusively on allied solidarity, but on its own level of preparedness, capabilities adapted to new forms of conflict and the existence of a credible naval force capable of generating unacceptable costs to any potential aggressor. Moreover, NATO doctrine itself implicitly confirms this strategic truth: The Alliance is strong to the extent that each member is itself strong, ready and able to resist until the collective defence mechanisms are fully activated[14] . Therefore, a paradigm shift is required in the planning and development of the Romanian Naval Forces, from a symbolic or purely defensive presence model to a deterrent, adaptable force model, operationalised on the concept of Sea Denial, capable of protecting national maritime interests and actively contributing to the security of NATO’s south-eastern flank.
In this new paradigm, the acquisition in the first phase of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), together with the development of asymmetric warfare and hybrid warfare capabilities, are no longer mere modernisation options, but become essential elements of a strategic architecture of active deterrence, adapted to the new geopolitical and doctrinal realities in the Black Sea.
Strategic conclusion
Romania must become in the Black Sea what Poland has become on NATO’s eastern land flank:
A resilience pivot state, capable of sustaining the first 7-10 days of naval conflict on its own, blocking, delaying, striking and turning any attempted aggression into an unacceptable strategic cost.
This is the future of smart, modern and deterrent naval forces.
The need to develop a National Strategy for Romania’s Maritime Security: between the imperatives of the geostrategic reality and the strategic obligation of the present
“In the absence of a clearly defined National Maritime Security Strategy, any development of naval capabilities risks remaining piecemeal, reactive and lacking an integrative vision.”
Romania is today the only NATO littoral state in the Black Sea that does not have a national strategy dedicated to maritime security – in the broad, inter-institutional and trans-sectoral sense of the concept.
In the dynamic and deeply volatile context of regional security in the wider Black Sea basin, Romania faces a fundamental challenge: the lack of a unified and officially recognised strategic vision for its own maritime space.
If in the past this absence could perhaps be justified by the relative stability of the regional environment and membership in collective security architectures (NATO and the EU), the conflict triggered by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022 has definitively invalidated the paradigm of passive expectation and exclusive dependence on the guarantees of a strategic ally.
Thus, it becomes not only timely, but urgently necessary, to develop and adopt a National Maritime Security Strategy for Romania – understood not as a marginal technical document, but as a fundamental integrating framework of security, defence, maritime economy and national resilience policies.
Moreover, the analysis of the contemporary naval conflict has shown that maritime space is no longer strictly delimited by classical naval operations, but extends to a wide range of interests and strategic responsibilities, including: protection of offshore energy infrastructure, securing exclusive economic zones, freedom of navigation, defence of submarine communications, control of strategic maritime traffic and prevention of hybrid threats.
A National Strategy for Maritime Security would allow Romania not only to correctly dimension its naval capabilities (including the urgent integration of OPV vessels), but also to coherently articulate the inter-institutional relationship between the military, civil and economic structures involved in the management of maritime space.
By adopting such a Strategy, Romania could go beyond the condition of an exclusively geographical maritime actor, assuming the status of a real strategic actor in the Black Sea – a state capable of defending its vital interests and of actively and credibly contributing to the collective security architecture of NATO and the European Union.
In the absence of such a vision, the development of the Romanian Naval Forces risks to remain a fragmented, reactive endeavour, lacking long-term strategic projection.
Therefore, the following strategic truth is required as a doctrinal and operational foundation:
Without a National Maritime Security Strategy, Romania remains a maritime actor geographically, but not strategically.
[1] Discussions about this possible solution have been mediatised.
[2]NAT Defence College, ‘Strategic Adaptation in the Black Sea Basin’, Research Paper No. 218, 2024.
[3] RAND Corporation, ‘The Future of Naval Warfare: Autonomy, AI, and Asymmetry’, Santa Monica, 2022.
[4] The emergence of risks in the Danube Delta, the Snake Island area and in the vicinity of offshore infrastructure clearly justifies the need for OPVs
[5] Naval News, ‘OPV Programmes in Europe: Trends and Perspectives’, 2023.
[6] Centre for European Policy Analysis, ‘Black Sea Security after Ukraine War’, 2024.
[7] Institut Français des Relations Internationales, ‘European Naval Strategies in a New Era’, 2023.
[8] Experimenting new unmanned systems and technologies
[9] https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/eu-incident-response-and-cyber-crisis-management/eu-cyclone
[10] Atlantic Council Task Force on Black Sea Security. “A Security Strategy for the Black Sea.” Atlantic Council, 15 December 2023. Accessed 5 April 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-security-strategy-for-the-black-sea/. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-security-strategy-for-the-black-sea/.
[11] “Russian-Ukrainian crisis (2021-2022).” Wikipedia: the free encyclopedia. Last modified: [date last modified]. Accessed 5 April 2025. https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criza_ruso-ucrainean%C4%83_(2021-2022). https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criza_ruso-ucrainean%C4%83_(2021-2022).
[12] implicit doctrine of credible collective defence
[13] Cristian Barbu, Romania’s Naval Forces post-2004: Realities and Perspectives, Military Publishing House, 2021
[14] NATO Defence College, Strategic Adaptation in the Black Sea Basin, Research Paper No. 218, Rome, 2024.